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ABSTRACT 
This article draws on original historical research, queer theory, 
communitarian philosophy, and an array of anthropological sources to 
suggest that efforts by Western liberals to protect practitioners of 
same-sex intimate conduct in Africa may be relatively unsuccessful 
and could further endanger the intended beneficiaries of advocacy. 
 
 Assistant Professor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School 
of Law. I am grateful for helpful comments from Professors Ken Gallant, Joshua 
Silverstein, Arthur Best, and Anastasia Boles. A research grant from the UALR William 
H. Bowen School of Law supported my work on this article. 
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In recent years, Western human rights activists, scholars, and 
politicians have worked to advance homosexual rights in Africa. 
Understandably, they have tended to frame their arguments in liberal, 
universalist terms. Given the successful reliance on liberal values of 
equality and autonomy to enhance the status of homosexuals in the 
West, this approach is intuitive. Liberal ideology has also become 
fully entrenched in international law, and the language of 
constitutions of countries across Africa reflects the influence of 
liberal philosophy. Nonetheless, numerous African leaders have 
responded to liberal appeals with hostility, and often with claims that 
homosexuality is un-African, a disease of the morally corrupt West. 
I am sympathetic to the liberal perspective, but consideration of 
ideas outside the liberal paradigm suggests reasons for caution in 
pursuing a liberal agenda to promote the well-being of people who 
engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa. Some of the anthropological 
evidence about the social significance of same-sex sexual intimacy in 
African cultures reinforces the claims of queer theorists, whose anti-
essentialist arguments suggest that sexual identity is socially 
constructed, rather than the product of an immutable, biological 
imperative. In many African cultures, both historically and today, 
people who have engaged in same-sex intimacies have considered 
that behavior an insignificant component of their personal and sexual 
identities. Furthermore, in many societies, same-sex intimacy has 
been primarily socially contingent, rather than a stable feature of the 
lives of people who engage in such conduct. This suggests obstacles 
for liberal nondiscrimination arguments. Likewise, the observation of 
queer theorists that essentialist claims can be used as effectively as 
tools of oppression as of liberation provides reason for caution; 
tyrannical majorities have frequently used the idea of fundamental, 
immutable difference as a means of subjugating disfavored 
minorities. In the end, categorizing all Africans who engage in same-
sex intimacies as homosexuals may make the intended beneficiaries 
of such categorization easier targets for majorities in societies 
disinclined to accept Western conceptions of sexual identity. 
Communitarian philosophy is also relevant to any discussion of the 
legal status of homosexuality in Africa because of the deep 
communitarian roots of traditional cultures across the continent. 
Although African countries have tended to adopt constitutions that 
proclaim liberal rights, many of the societies in which those 
constitutions have arisen have lacked the West’s profound cultural 
commitment to individualism. Instead, a broad range of African 
cultures have tended to emphasize group welfare and individual 
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responsibilities over individual rights. As a consequence, 
communitarian values have frequently explained the actual operation 
of law in African countries better than the putative liberal loyalties 
evinced in African constitutions. This communitarian perspective also 
suggests obstacles to advancement of homosexual rights in Africa 
through liberal arguments. 
Finally, a deeper appreciation of the sordid history of Western 
imposition of universalizing ideals to manipulate and subjugate 
African minds and bodies, and of Western denial of African agency, 
might alert liberals to the treacherous intellectual territory they inhabit 
and might help liberals avoid colonialist tropes that could further 
inflame resistance to policies aimed at enhancement of the status of 
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa. Western liberals 
are correct to counter African claims that homosexuality is un-African 
by pointing out that European outsiders originally introduced 
religious intolerance and sodomy laws to African cultures that had 
been more amenable to same-sex intimacy. But African leaders who 
insist on the Western origins of homosexuality are also correct, 
though in an unintended sense: the presence in many contemporary 
African cultures of some people who define their sexual identities in 
terms congruous with Western conceptions of homosexuality may 
indeed be the consequence of Western influence. Additionally, even 
though there are now some Africans who consider themselves 
homosexuals, advocacy by Western rights advocates and threats by 
Western governments might cause backlash that could make their 
lives worse. Ultimately, if liberals hope to have a positive impact on 
the lives of Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies, we should 
structure our interactions with the cultures we hope to influence as 
conversations rather than as lectures or commands. 
INTRODUCTION 
A short film featured on The New York Times website in early 2013 
addresses the ongoing struggle in Uganda over the legal status of 
homosexuality, emphasizing the role American evangelicals have 
played in funding and encouraging the Africans who have worked to 
enact oppressive laws and policies and who have expressed intolerant, 
bigoted views of homosexuals. The film, Gospel of Intolerance,1 
offers a lucid counterpoint to the numerous, prominent assertions of 
 
1 Roger Ross Williams, Gospel of Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/opinion/gospel-of-intolerance.html?_r=0. 
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African leaders that homosexuality is foreign to the African continent, 
a Western construction, and a neocolonial imposition on traditional 
African culture and values. In fact, the film suggests to its viewers, 
American religious conservatives are the neocolonialists, using 
Western money to shape the opinions of Africans to fit the 
Westerners’ constricted, harmful views on morality and human 
nature. 
The movie’s observations are accurate enough, yet it is also true 
that both the filmmaker and the American evangelicals reproduce 
important features of imperialist discourse. With the self-conscious 
extension of an American “culture war” to the African continent, both 
the evangelicals and the filmmaker advocate universalizing norms of 
Western origin, which each contingent argues should mold African 
law and culture. The filmmaker, moreover, participates in a 
longstanding colonialist tradition by denying agency to the majority 
of Africans, and their leaders, who express anti-homosexual 
sentiment. According to the implicit message of the film, the African 
politicians who make vitriolic public attacks on homosexuality are 
mere puppets of sinister outside forces, incapable of possessing their 
own morally coherent perspective. 
The direct claims of the evangelicals, and of many Africans, have a 
deeply established pedigree, dating at least to eighteenth-century 
accounts by explorers and missionaries who asserted that homosexual 
conduct was essentially foreign to the African continent.2 At the 
height of colonialism in Africa, in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Victorian-era laws against homosexual conduct, applicable 
in the colonies as in the metropole, reflected the period ideology that 
heterosexuality was the natural norm, and that homosexuality was 
both biologically and morally deviant.3 Contemporary rights 
advocates assert their own universalizing rubric, derived from an 
alternative European lineage: the liberal notion of universal human 
rights to equal treatment and autonomy, dating to the Enlightenment 
philosophy of John Locke. Liberal philosophy came to encompass 
claims for the rights of homosexuals (a class Enlightenment 
philosophers such as Locke would not have recognized or understood 
in modern terms) only much later. Yet that philosophy now defines 
the modern framework for human rights law, including assertions of 
the rights of homosexuals, based on broader rights enumerated both in 
 
2 See infra Part V. 
3 See infra Part II. 
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national constitutions and in international covenants.4 And just as 
modern homosexual rights advocates suggest that Western 
conservatives are the true source of anti-homosexual sentiment in 
Africa, colonial Europeans (and their modern Western and African 
intellectual counterparts) contended that homosexual activity in 
Africa was the product of an external menace, at the time the morally 
licentious Arabs and Portuguese of Burton’s infamous Sotadic Zone.5 
Understandably, advocates for the normalization and protection of 
homosexuality in Africa have tended to frame their arguments in 
liberal, universalist terms. This approach is intuitive, given successful 
reliance on liberal values of equality and autonomy to enhance the 
status of homosexuals in the West. Moreover, liberal ideology has 
become fully entrenched in international law, and the language of 
constitutions of countries across Africa also reflects the influence of 
liberal philosophy. I am sympathetic to the liberal perspective. I 
believe, however, that Western lawyers, scholars, and human rights 
activists who have considered the status of homosexuality in Africa 
have given insufficient attention to ideas outside the liberal paradigm 
that suggest reasons for caution in pursuing a liberal agenda to 
improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in 
Africa. 
In this article, I will contextualize liberal claims within the broader 
anthropological and philosophical discourse on gay identity and gay 
rights, including an overview of current and historical conceptions of 
homosexual behavior and sexual identity in various African cultures. I 
will discuss the ideology of queer theorists, whose anti-essentialist 
arguments reinforce some of the anthropological evidence about the 
significance of same-sex sexual intimacy in African societies.6 
Although the anthropological record demonstrates geographically 
widespread behavior that modern, Western observers would 
characterize as homosexual, both current and historical 
understandings of this behavior would frequently confound modern 
constructions of homosexual identity.7 In fact, many Africans who 
engage in what Westerners would term homosexual conduct consider 
that conduct a relatively insignificant component not only of their 
overall identities, but an unimportant component even of their sexual 
 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 MARC EPPRECHT, HUNGOCHANI: THE HISTORY OF A DISSIDENT SEXUALITY IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 8 (2005). 
6 See infra Part IV.B. 
7 See infra Part V. 
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identities.8 This anthropological substantiation of the anti-essentialist 
arguments of queer theorists suggests significant obstacles for liberal 
nondiscrimination arguments. Likewise, the observation of queer 
theorists that essentialist arguments can be used as effectively as tools 
of oppression as of liberation provides reason for caution by liberals 
attempting to improve African lives by classifying them in Western, 
essentialist terms. 
I will also discuss communitarian philosophy and its relationship to 
many African cultures. Communitarian arguments are particularly 
salient in the context of any discussion of the legal status of 
homosexuality in Africa because of the deep communitarian roots of 
traditional cultures across the continent.9 Although African countries 
have tended to adopt constitutions that proclaim liberal rights, many 
of the societies in which those constitutions have arisen have lacked 
the profound cultural commitment to individualism that observers like 
Michael Sandel have noted in the United States.10 Instead, African 
cultures have tended to emphasize group welfare over individual 
rights.11 As a consequence, communitarian values have frequently 
explained the actual operation of law in African countries better than 
the putative liberal loyalties evinced in African constitutions.12 This 
communitarian perspective also suggests obstacles to advancement of 
homosexual rights in Africa through liberal arguments. Ultimately, 
both communitarians and queer theorists deny the very existence of 
rights as trumps transcending the values of the communities in which 
such claims are made. 
These contexts—the anti-essentialist claims of queer theorists, the 
African anthropological record, and communitarian philosophy—may 
be useful to liberal human rights activists; they suggest the likely 
depth of political resistance to liberal initiatives, which homosexual 
rights advocates must consider before designing strategies to improve 
the lives of practitioners of same-sex intimacies in Africa. Similarly, a 
more expansive appreciation of the historical forces and traditions 
that have influenced African thought might alert liberals to the 
 
8 Id. 
9 See infra Part IV.A. 
10 See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN 
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (hereinafter SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S 
DISCONTENT); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF 
MARKETS (2013) (describing the pervasive commodification of social goods in the United 
States). 
11 See infra Part IV.A. 
12 Id. 
2013] Western Universalism and African Homosexualities 321 
somewhat treacherous intellectual territory they inhabit. In advocating 
for universal rights, liberals would do well to recognize the sordid 
history of Western imposition of universalizing ideals to influence 
and subjugate African minds and bodies. Such an appreciation might 
facilitate avoidance of the tropes of colonialism that could further 
inflame resistance to policies aimed at enhancement of the status of 
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa. 
This discussion would be salient in a large number of cultures 
outside of Africa as well. Traditional societies outside of Africa have 
often emphasized group welfare over individual rights.13 Additionally, 
patterns of same-sex sexual contact in societies outside of Africa have 
frequently confounded Western conceptions of sexual identity.14 
Despite these potentially broader implications, I have chosen to focus 
on Africa, both because it coincides with my professional interests, 
and because the African reaction to homosexuality has incurred 
special attention from Western activists in recent years. This attention 
has been due, in part, to the extremity of some legal responses to 
homosexuality in Africa. It has, I believe, also been a consequence of 
the extreme license Westerners have historically felt entitled to take in 
attempting to influence African cultures to match Western ideals. 
In Part II of this article, I will provide a brief overview of the legal 
status of homosexuality in Africa and of responses to African laws by 
liberal human rights advocates. In Part III, I will examine liberal legal 
arguments for homosexual rights in Africa. Although there is an 
 
13 See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765, 
n.198 (2009) (describing the Chthonic focus on human relationships in opposition to the 
Western emphasis on individual property ownership over community rights); Eugene KB 
Tan, ‘We’ v ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTRL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2002); 
Timothy Webster, China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 626, 634 (2013) (stating that, “[l]ike other Asian countries, China stresses 
communitarian values, the importance of groups within society and the state’s interest over 
those of the individual”). 
14 As I will discuss below, even in the West, the modern sexual taxonomy, which 
conceives of homosexuality as an immutable characteristic of personal and sexual identity, 
did not arise until the latter half of the nineteenth century. See infra Part IV.B. For a broad 
critique of efforts to universalize Western concepts of sexual orientation, see Sonia Katyal, 
Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (drawing heavily on examples from 
Thailand and India and arguing that the incompatibility of Western notions of sexual 
identity with ideas about same-sex intimacy in non-Western cultures suggests legal 
scholars interested in promoting rights of sexual minorities internationally should focus on 
autonomy rather than identity); LADY BOYS, TOM BOYS, RENT BOYS: MALE AND FEMALE 
SEXUALITIES IN CONTEMPORARY THAILAND (Peter A. Jackson & Gerard Sullivan eds., 
1999). For an in-depth analysis of the incompatibility of historical Arab conceptions of 
sexuality with Western ideas about sexual identity, see JOSEPH A. MASSAD, DESIRING 
ARABS (2007). 
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ongoing academic debate between liberals and communitarians that 
transcends gay rights discourse, and although queer theorists continue 
to challenge the essentialist foundations of liberal philosophy, liberal, 
universalist paradigms have clearly prevailed in the international legal 
sphere. But despite the plausible basis international agreements and 
national constitutions provide for these arguments, international 
enforcement mechanisms are insufficient to offer much practical 
significance to such claims in the near future. Furthermore, given the 
depth of anti-homosexual sentiment in many African societies, the use 
of national courts to pursue a gay rights agenda, even if initially 
successful, has the potential to incite political backlash that could 
undermine the legal and physical security of the intended 
beneficiaries of litigation. In Part IV, I will examine critiques of 
liberalism that might be useful to liberals interested in advancing 
homosexual rights in Africa, including arguments about an imperialist 
impulse inherent to liberalism and about the potential for liberal 
initiatives in the developing world to backfire. I will focus in 
particular in Part IV on communitarian philosophy and queer theory, 
each of which offers potential insight on likely obstacles to liberal 
arguments for gay rights in Africa. In Part V, I will discuss the 
anthropological record of same-sex intimacies in various African 
cultures. To some degree, this record confirms the anti-essentialist 
claims of queer theorists. In Part VI, I will offer observations about 
the implications of communitarian thought, queer theory, and African 
anthropological evidence for liberals interested in promoting 
homosexual rights in Africa. To the extent that communitarian 
philosophy coincides with deeply rooted cultural perspectives in 
Africa, an individual rights-based agenda may be less likely to 
succeed. To the extent that people in Africa who engage in what 
Westerners would call homosexual practices are neither thought of as 
homosexuals by members of their communities, nor think of 
themselves in such terms, Western insistence on categorizing such 
individuals as homosexuals may endanger them. Overall, human 
rights advocates would do well to consider the potential unintended 
consequences of pursuing a liberal agenda to advance homosexual 
rights in Africa. In the final analysis, the lessons of this research 
suggest that Western lawyers, scholars, policy-makers, and activists 
hoping to improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex 
intimacies in Africa should proceed with extreme caution. 
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I 
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD AFRICAN 
HOMOSEXUALITY 
Today, homosexual activity is legally prohibited in thirty-six of 
Africa’s fifty-four countries.15 The severity of the prescribed 
punishments for homosexual sex in Africa varies significantly, from a 
maximum of one year of imprisonment in Liberia,16 to life 
imprisonment in Sierra Leone17 and Tanzania,18 to the death penalty 
in Mauritania, parts of Northern Nigeria, Southern Somalia, and 
Sudan.19 In Uganda, legislative attempts since 2009 to authorize a 
death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” have received 
widespread attention.20 In eleven Francophone African countries, 
same-sex sexual intimacy has never been criminalized.21 However, 
even in some of these countries, the age of consent for same-sex 
sexual activity is higher than the age of consent for heterosexual 
sex.22 In Lesotho and South Africa, modern protections for 
homosexuals have replaced earlier laws against same-sex sexual 
contact, and in Cape Verde, an older proscription of homosexual 
activity is absent in the modern penal code.23 In some countries, like 
 
15 LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY & JINGSHU ZHU, STATE SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA—A 
WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS: CRIMINALISATION, PROTECTION AND RECOGNITION OF SAME-
SEX LOVE 33 (2013), available at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State 
_Sponsored_Homophobia_2013.pdf. 
16 Id. at 51. 
17 Id. at 57. 
18 Id. at 59. 
19 Id. at 58. 
20 See, e.g., Daniel Englander, Comment, Protecting the Human Rights of LGBT People 
in Uganda in the Wake of Uganda’s “Anti-Homosexuality Bill, 2009,” 25 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 1263 (2011); Michael Hollander, Note, Gay Rights in Uganda: Seeking to Overturn 
Uganda’s Anti-Sodomy Laws, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 219 (2009); Tiffany M. Lebrón, 
Comment, “Death to Gays!” Uganda’s ‘One Step Forward, One Step Back’ Approach to 
Human Rights, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173 (2011); Williams, supra note 1. 
21 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 21 (noting that same-sex sexual activity has 
never been prohibited in Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Rwanda); 
Uganda: Reject Anti-Homosexuality Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 10, 2011, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/10/uganda-reject-anti-homosexuality-bill. 
22 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 20 (noting a higher age of consent for 
homosexual sex than for heterosexual sex in Benin); id. at 24 (stating that the age of 
consent in Congo Brazzaville is thirteen for heterosexual sex and twenty-one for 
homosexual sex, a distinction inherited from French colonialists). 
23 Id. 
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Egypt, facially neutral laws have often been used to prosecute people 
who engage in same-sex sexual activity.24 
As this overview reveals, Francophone African countries have been 
less likely to explicitly criminalize same-sex intimacies. This 
distinction seems to date to the more permissive policies of Belgian 
and French colonialists on this issue in some of their colonies,25 as 
compared with the British, who consistently targeted indigenous 
corporeal intimacies they deemed deviant in all of their colonies.26 
Nonetheless, some Francophone African countries criminalized 
homosexual conduct after independence.27 In Lusophone, Africa, 
Portuguese colonial laws prohibited sodomy, and both Angola and 
Mozambique have retained the prohibition in their current penal 
codes.28 
The British approach stemmed from law applicable in England, 
where the nineteenth-century Offences Against the Person Act had 
reduced the punishment for sodomy and other “unnatural” sexual acts 
from death to imprisonment for ten years to life. After initially 
introducing a version of the Act in India, Britain then exported it to all 
of its colonial possessions.29 Today, former British colonies that 
continue to criminalize same-sex sexual activity have tended to retain 
much of the original language from Section 377, which reads: 
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of 
nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with 
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine. 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal 
intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.30 
My own examination of public archives in Zambia reveals the 
British colonial government and its predecessor, the British South 
Africa Company, used a version of this law to prosecute men who 
engaged in same-sex intimacies in the territory during the colonial 
period. In some cases, colonial officials used the law to prosecute 
 
24 Id. at 46. 
25 See, e.g., id. at 20–24. But see Neela Ghoshal, Africa’s Small Steps Toward LGBTI 
Equality, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 17, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/17 
/africas-small-steps-toward-lgbti-equality (noting colonial sodomy laws in Mauritius). 
26 Ghoshal, supra note 25. 
27 Id. (observing that the French had no sodomy laws in Burundi or Cameroon, but both 
countries enacted their own laws penalizing homosexual conduct after independence). 
28 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 43, 54. 
29 Douglas E. Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism in Asia, 4 
ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 8 (2009). 
30 Central Government Act, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA PEN. CODE (1860), § 377. 
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older males who had sexual contacts with children. For example, 
inspection of the 214 criminal cases in Class II Subordinate Court in 
1942 in Fort Jameson,31 in what is now Zambia’s Eastern Province, 
shows two such prosecutions. In one case, Rex v. Chajaso Zulu, the 
defendant, a seventeen-year-old male, pleaded guilty to a charge of 
committing “an act of gross indecency with another male” after he 
persuaded a thirteen-year-old “to lie on the ground” in the bush near a 
village and “then committed the offense.”32 Zulu’s sentence was six 
strokes with a cane.33 In the other, Rex v. Hamid Ahmed Malek, the 
defendant, a “British Indian Male Adult,” faced a charge of “Indecent 
Practices Between Males” after an encounter with Kufwa Zimba, a 
nine or ten-year-old boy.34 Likewise, a reading of the ninety-five 
available criminal cases in the Native Commissioner’s Court in 
Livingstone in 1913 reveals the case of Rex v. Likandu, in which the 
defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of committing “an act of gross 
indecency with another male person,” a boy about ten years old.35 
Likandu claimed to have believed the boy was a woman.36 He 
received a sentence of two months imprisonment with hard labor.37 
Significantly, although each of these cases involved conduct 
current readers would likely conceive of as child molestation and 
sexual assault, the nature of the charges demonstrates that, for the 
British, the defendants’ transgressions were tied, at least in part, to the 
occurrence of same-sex sexual contact.38 In other cases, the British 
charged indigenous defendants with “gross indecency with another 
male” without specifying the age of the other party.39 These cases 
represented, for the British, only a part of a broader effort to control 
indigenous sexuality through counterparts to Section 377. In Fort 
Jameson in 1942, for example, the colonial government charged two 
 
31 Fort Jameson is now called Chipata. 
32 Zambia National Archives [ZNA] EP 4/13/6, Case No. 64 of 1942. 
33 Id. 
34 ZNA EP 4/13/6, Case No. 171 of 1942. 
35 ZNA KSC 2/2/2, Case No. 21 of 1913. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 In one case in the Native Commissioner’s Court in Livingstone in 1913, a defendant 
did face a charge of “indecent assault on a male person.” The court sentenced the 
defendant to one year of imprisonment with hard labor and fifteen lashes. ZNA KSC 
2/2/2/, Rex v. Liabwa, Case No. 108 of 1913. 
39 See, e.g., ZNA 4/13/19, Regina v. Elias Sowoyo, Case No. 418 of 1954, Subordinate 
Court, Class I, Fort Jameson. 
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men with attempting to have carnal knowledge of cows.40 The British, 
of course, also sought to use colonial law to shape indigenous 
behavior more generally to reflect contemporary British values.41 
As I will detail in Part V, anthropological evidence reveals that 
people from a wide variety of African cultures, before, during, and 
after colonial rule, have engaged in what many Westerners would 
characterize as homosexual sex. Despite this evidence, Africans 
opposed to homosexuality now frequently cast homosexuality as un-
African and as a Western, neocolonial menace.42 In 1999, 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe expressed this sentiment in 
referring to Britain’s “gay government,” which he believed was 
attempting to impose homosexuality on Africans.43 In the same year, 
Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi declared, “It is not right that a 
man should go with another man or a woman with another woman. It 
 
40 ZNA 4/13/6, Rex v. Mayonga Banda, Case No. 16 of 1942; Rex v. James Mvula, 
Case No. 153 of 1942. 
41 A prominent example of such use of the law was the British prosecution of colonial 
subjects for claiming to have the powers of witchcraft or accusing others of being witches. 
See MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 
IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 85–102 (1985). British prosecutions of colonial subjects for 
claiming to have powers of witchcraft, or accusing others of being witches, reflected 
changing attitudes on the issue at home—in seventeenth-century England, legislation 
punished people for being witches, but by the early eighteenth century, the law no longer 
recognized the possibility of actual witchcraft, and new legislation punished people for 
pretending to have the power of witchcraft. Id. at 94. My own investigation of colonial 
cases in the Zambia National Archives shows the prevalence of British prosecutions of 
indigenous subjects for claiming to be witches or accusing others of being witches. For 
example, in Mwinilunga District (in Northwestern Province in Zambia) seven of seventy-
one criminal cases in the Native Commissioner’s Court in 1915 involved witchcraft 
charges. ZNA KSE 3/2/2/2. In the same court in 1926, three of 135 prosecutions were for 
witchcraft claims. ZNA 3/2/2/5. In 1927, three of 110 criminal cases in that court involved 
such charges. ZNA 3/2/2/6. In 1956, the Class III Subordinate Court in Fort Jameson 
sentenced one person convicted of accusing another of witchcraft to eighteen months of 
imprisonment with hard labor. ZNA EP 4/13/20, R v. Shadrack Jere, Jan. 27, 1956. 
42 For some authors, African resistance to homosexuality represents a rejection only of 
Western-inspired gay identity, not a condemnation of same-sex physical intimacy more 
broadly. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 14, at 126 (asserting that that, in the case of 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s public denunciations of homosexuality, “sexual 
identity per se, not same-sex sexual conduct, is the central target of such attacks”); Joseph 
Massad, Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 14 PUB. 
CULTURE 361 (2002) (arguing that Egyptian prosecutions represented resistance to 
Western gay identity rather than to same-sex intimacy). But although many anti-
homosexual pronouncements by Africans have reflected resistance to perceived Western 
imperialism, much African criticism of homosexuality has involved broad condemnation 
of same-sex sexual practices. Furthermore, those who have suggested a distinction 
between African criticism of homosexual identity and rejection of same-sex intimacy more 
generally have tended to be Western theorists, not African leaders themselves. 
43 EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 4. 
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is against African tradition and Biblical teachings. I will not shy away 
from warning Kenyans against the dangers of the scourge.”44 In 
Namibia, Alpheus Naruseb, the secretary for Information and 
Publicity for the South West Africa People’s Organization, asserted, 
“It should be noted that most of the ardent supporters of these perverts 
are Europeans who imagine themselves to be the bulwark of 
civilisation and enlightenment. They are not only appropriating 
foreign ideas in our society but also destroying the local culture by 
hiding behind the façade of the very democracy and human right (sic) 
we have created.”45 In 2004, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo 
declared homosexuality to be “unbiblical, unnatural and definitely un-
African.”46 In a 2013 article published by the Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation, a journalist noted recent British threats to cut aid to 
Ghana if the country persisted in criminalizing homosexuality and 
questioned, “[W]hy is Ghana always a target for Britain? Is it a case 
of neo-colonialism?”47 
The sense of conflict between a pro-homosexual West and African 
opposition to homosexuality has been evident amongst religious as 
well as political leaders. Perhaps most famously, at the 1998 Lambeth 
Conference of the Anglican Communion, African and Asian bishops 
combined to defeat North American and European motions in favor of 
gay rights. At the time, the United States Episcopal Church had 
already been ordaining openly gay clergy for several years, and by 
2003, the Church of England would propose a gay man for Bishop of 
Reading. 48 Nonetheless, African and Asian clergy outnumbered their 
North American and European counterparts at Lambeth, and, in the 
end, the conference passed a statement declaring homosexual 
practices to be “incompatible with scripture.”49 The belief that 
Western appeals for homosexual rights represent merely the latest 
iteration of Western cultural imperialism certainly increases the 
likelihood of resistance in societies buffeted by a long history of 
 
44 NEVILLE HOAD, AFRICAN INTIMACIES: RACE, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND 
GLOBALIZATION xii (2007). 
45 Id. at 15. 
46 World Briefing—Africa: Nigeria: President Backs African Bishops Over Gays, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2004), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE7D7123 
DF93BA15753C1A9629C8B63. 
47 Justice Mingle, Proposed UK Visa Restriction, GHANA BROADCASTING 
CORPORATION (June 28, 2013), http://www.gbcghana.com/index.php?id=1.1436391. 
48 PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY 
251 (2002). 
49 Id. See also HOAD, supra note 44, at 51. 
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colonial interference. As I will discuss in further detail below, there is 
a sense (although largely unappreciated by African leaders who attack 
homosexuality) in which this belief is correct. 
Overall, broad majorities of the populations in all African countries 
where data is available have expressed disapproval of homosexuality. 
In 2003, a Pew research report including information from nine 
African countries revealed that majorities in all nine countries 
believed society should not accept homosexuality.50 This ranged from 
a mere 62 percent of the Angolan population who disapproved of 
homosexuality to 99 percent of Kenyans.51 By 2013, Pew data on 
seven African countries continued to show popular disapproval of 
homosexuality in all countries, with majorities of over 90 percent of 
people in six of the seven nations in the study believing that society 
should not accept homosexuality.52 
Western rights advocates have tended to respond to claims about 
the un-African nature of homosexuality with counter-assertions, 
including recitations of the history of colonial imposition of anti-
homosexual norms,53 and anthropological observations that seem to 
refute African contentions.54 Neville Hoad, an American-based 
English Professor from South Africa, has described these Western 
efforts as attempts to “consolidate[e] evidence from elsewhere to 
 
50 The 2003 report found that 62 percent of Angolans, 63 percent of South Africans, 84 
percent of people from Ivory Coast, 93 percent of Ghanaians, 95 percent of Ugandans, 95 
percent of Nigerians, 96 percent of Malians, 98 percent of Senegalese, and 99 percent of 
Kenyans believed society should not accept homosexuality. News Release: Global Views 
on Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 19, Nov. 
18, 2003, http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/religion      
-homosexuality.pdf. 
51 Id. 
52 The 2013 report found that 61% of South Africans, 90% of Kenyans, 96% of 
Ugandans, 96% of Ghanaians, 96% of Senegalese, and 98% of Nigerians believed society 
should not accept homosexuality. The Global Divide on Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (June 4, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/2013 /06/04/the-global-divide-on-
homosexuality/. 
53 See, e.g., EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that African arguments against 
homosexuality “appear to be borrowed wholesale from social conservatives in the West, 
while repressive laws are a direct legacy of colonial rule. Even the claim that same-sex 
sexual behaviour is un-African appears to have originated in the West rather than Africa 
itself.”); Eusebius McKaiser, Homosexuality Un-African? The Claim is an Historical 
Embarrassment, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012 
/oct/02/homosexuality-unafrican-claim-historical-embarrassment. 
54 See, e.g., EPPRECHT, supra note 5; RUTH MORGAN AND SASKIA WIERENGA, TOMMY 
BOYS, LESBIAN MEN AND ANCESTRAL WIVES: FEMALE SAME-SEX PRACTICES IN AFRICA 
(2006); STEPHEN O. MURRAY & WILL ROSCOE, BOY-WIVES AND FEMALE HUSBANDS: 
STUDIES IN AFRICAN HOMOSEXUALITIES (1998); McKaiser, supra note 53. 
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universalize and naturalize one’s own experience,” and has noted that 
such efforts to universalize Western notions of homosexuality have a 
longstanding lineage, dating to the nineteenth century.55 In Hoad’s 
assessment, typical of the postmodernist claims of queer theorists, 
these attempts to prove the existence of minority sexual identity lack 
the liberating potential homosexual rights advocates assume, for they 
“precisely reproduce[] the terms of the debate [they] wish . . . to end 
in a landscape of assertion and counterassertion.”56 
I will discuss the insight arguments like Hoad’s might offer to 
liberal rights advocates in Part IV. First, however, I will provide an 
overview of the primarily liberal claims by Westerners hoping to 
improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in 
Africa. Ultimately, while there are good reasons to question the 
efficacy of liberal arguments, these sorts of claims have tended to 
define the Western response to antihomosexual sentiment from 
Africans, shaping the policies of Western governments and 
influencing the development of international law. 
Recent appeals by human rights organizations are numerous. In 
May of 2013, in response to an ongoing sodomy prosecution in 
Zambia, Human Rights Watch commanded, in a headline, Zambia: 
Stop Prosecuting People for Homosexuality.57 Invoking the liberal 
foundations of Zambian and international law, the organization 
argued that “[t]he Zambian government is obligated under 
international law and its own constitution to respect the private lives 
and personal liberties of everyone in the country, and to cease 
prosecuting people for consensual adult sex.”58 Similarly, Amnesty 
International’s director of law and policy recently condemned anti-
homosexuality laws across the African continent, stating, “These 
poisonous laws must be repealed and the human rights of all Africans 
upheld.”59 In the legal academy, law review articles have frequently 
 
55 HOAD, supra note 44, at xxv. 
56 Id. at xxiv (alteration in original). 
57 Zambia: Stop Prosecuting People for Homosexuality, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 
20, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/20/zambia-stop-prosecuting-people-homo 
sexuality. 
58 Id. 
59 Erin Conway-Smith, Africa’s Anti-Gay Attacks Reach ‘Dangerous’ Levels, GLOBAL 
POST (June 25, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/130625 
/anti-gay-attacks-africa-criminalization-homosexuality-amnest-international. 
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advanced liberal legal arguments for the protection of homosexual 
status in Africa.60 
Such arguments by academics and human rights organizations have 
paralleled the words and actions of Western governments and 
international organizations. In December of 2011, President Barack 
Obama instructed federal agencies to begin promoting homosexual 
and transgender rights overseas. At the same time, Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton told the United Nations Human Rights Council that 
“Gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.”61 In 
Senegal in June, 2013, Obama praised the previous week’s United 
States Supreme Court rulings overturning the Defense of Marriage 
Act (DOMA) and clearing the way for gay marriage in California. 
Obama argued that although different countries’ customs and 
religious beliefs should be respected, all people must be treated 
equally.62 Acknowledging that the “issue of gays and lesbians and 
how they are treated has come up and has been controversial in many 
parts of Africa,” Obama stated that he wanted the “African people to 
hear just what I believe. People should be treated equally. And that’s 
a principle that I think should be applied universally.”63 Senegal’s 
President, Macky Sall, responded that Senegal is not ready to 
decriminalize homosexuality.64 
Western appeals for greater tolerance of homosexuality in Africa 
have been accompanied, at times, by implicit or explicit threats to cut 
aid to noncompliant countries. In Hillary Clinton’s speech to the 
Human Rights Council, she promised “to ensure that our foreign 
assistance promotes the protection of LGBT rights.”65 In late 2011, 
 
60 See, e.g., Sophie M. Clavier, Objection Overruled: The Binding Nature of the 
International Norm Prohibiting Discrimination Against Homosexual and Transgendered 
Individuals, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 385 (2012); Katyal, supra note 14 (arguing for the 
use of privacy arguments rather than nondiscrimination arguments to advance the rights of 
sexual minorities internationally); Englander, supra note 20; Courtney E. Finerty, Note, 
Being Gay In Kenya: The Implications of Kenya’s New Constitution for its Anti-Sodomy 
Laws, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 431 (2012); Hollander, supra note 20; Lebrón, supra note 
20. 
61 The Associated Press, Africa’s Anti-Gay Laws: A Look at Uganda, Malawi and 
More, June 24, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/24/africa-anti-gay-laws_n 
_3491 565.html. 
62 Jennifer Lazuta, In Senegal, Obama Touts Gay Rights, USA TODAY, June 28, 2013, 
at 2A. 
63 Drew Hinshaw, Obama Promotes Sub-Saharan Ties, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2013. 
64 Id. Lazuta, supra note 62. 
65 Robbie Corey-Boulet, The Obama Administration’s Bold But Risky Plan to Make 
Africa Gay-Friendly, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/inter  
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British Prime Minister David Cameron made a much more 
straightforward statement that Britain would cut aid to countries that 
fail to respect homosexual rights.66 Meanwhile, bodies like the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee have repeatedly condemned laws 
that discriminate against homosexuals.67 Ultimately, backlash against 
Western appeals for homosexual rights in Africa may explain 
increasing numbers of prosecutions of people who engage in same-
sex intimacies in some countries, efforts to increase penalties for 
homosexual conduct, and, generally, increasingly negative public 
focus on an issue that most people had previously ignored.68 
As I will discuss below, the ideas of communitarians and queer 
theorists, coupled with evidence of African cultural attitudes and 
practices, pose significant challenges for liberal human rights 
activists. Nonetheless, the profound potential of liberal arguments to 
increase human freedom makes liberal philosophy an intuitively 
appealing framework for improving the lives of homosexuals around 
the world. Moreover, liberal philosophy has had a momentous impact 
on both international law and the domestic law of countries around 
the world, including African nations. The denial by communitarians 
and queer theorists of the existence of rights also suggests the 
inherent limitations of any approach that requires total disavowal of 
foundational liberal principles. Thus, while I believe that investigation 
of African cultures and the ideas of communitarians and queer 
theorists suggest reasons for extreme caution in attempting to advance 
a liberal homosexual rights agenda in Africa, I do not propose that 
liberals should abandon their philosophical allegiance. Rather, 
consideration of all available evidence suggests that traditional liberal 
strategies could backfire. In the next Part, I offer an account of liberal 
philosophy in general and liberal legal arguments for gay rights in 
particular. 
 
national/archive/2012/03/the-obama-administrations-bold-but-risky-plan-to-make-africa    
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66 Ghana Refuses to Grant Gays’ Rights Despite Aid Threat, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 
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67 See infra Part III. 
68 In Liberia, for example, there were no prosecutions for sodomy in the years 
preceding Obama’s instruction to federal agencies to promote homosexual rights abroad. 
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II 
LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
Writing over a decade ago, Carlos Ball noted that despite an 
ongoing debate in the legal academy between liberals and 
communitarians, commentary on the status of gay men and lesbians in 
the United States had largely ignored that debate. Instead, those 
discussing homosexuality in America had tended to use a liberal, 
rights-based structure to frame the dialogue.69 Today, political and 
legal debates about homosexuality tend to exclude not only 
consideration of communitarian philosophy, but also analysis of the 
observations of queer theorists, the anthropologists, philosophers, 
sociologists, historians and literary critics who have, for decades, 
questioned the essentialist basis for homosexual identity that liberal 
rights advocates have often assumed.70 As Professor Ball observed, 
this liberal approach centers on claims of rights to privacy and to non-
discrimination,71 both fundamental tenets of liberal theory. Since 
Professor Ball made his observations, both popular and legal culture 
in the United States have evolved dramatically toward greater 
acceptance of the claims of liberal, homosexual rights activists. The 
Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas,72 overturned Texas’s anti-
sodomy law, overruling its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.73  
Meanwhile, although thirty-three states have passed constitutional 
amendments or legislation banning same-sex marriage, sixteen states 
and Washington, D.C., allow homosexual marriage, and several other 
states allow civil unions or other legal partnerships granting many of 
the legal benefits of marriage.74 In June of 2013, the Supreme Court 
struck down the Defense of Marriage Act,75 which had denied federal 
benefits to married same-sex couples, and cleared the way for same-
sex marriage in California by leaving in place a district court 
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determination that a California constitutional amendment banning 
homosexual marriage violated the federal Constitution.76 
As in the United States, discussion of the status of homosexuals 
internationally has tended to center on notions of equality and 
autonomy at the heart of liberal ideology. Unsurprisingly, then, this 
liberal focus has shaped analysis of the laws of the numerous African 
countries that have criminalized homosexual conduct and, more 
broadly, have implemented policies that marginalize and discriminate 
against homosexuals.77 This rights-based focus has also dictated the 
terms in which Western and Western-influenced activists have 
characterized and critiqued expressions of popular African sentiment, 
often by national leaders, condemning homosexuals as deviant, 
unnatural, immoral, and influenced by corrupt Western ideology and 
values. 
There are good reasons for adhering to a liberal framework in 
seeking to improve the lives of homosexuals in Africa. First, as 
mentioned above, the liberal paradigm has become fully entrenched in 
international law. With the ratification of post World War II 
conventions beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
liberal, universalist philosophy became the foundation of a new body 
of international law, defining relationships between states and citizens 
in areas that before had been left to the realm of domestic political 
decision-making. As the former colonies of European powers became 
sovereign nations in the second half of the twentieth century, the new 
states not only ratified these international human rights documents, 
but also implemented constitutions reflecting the liberal values of the 
Western countries from which they had gained independence. Second, 
liberalism offers an appealing basis for advocacy because its 
presupposition of rights that precede political acceptance provides a 
conceptual bulwark against the perils that alternatives to liberalism, 
like communitarianism and queer theory, pose for homosexuals; 
ultimately, if, as communitarians and queer theorists suggest, there is 
no room for an idea of rights that precede other social norms, 
protection of the interests of homosexuals and other minority groups 
depends entirely on social acceptance of minority interests. The idea 
of rights becomes, in that case, a tautology at best. 
In Part IV, I will discuss communitarian thought and queer theory, 
including analysis of the ways these schools of thought might inform 
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liberal approaches to human rights advocacy in Africa. At this point, 
it is worth providing an overview of liberal philosophy and the 
international, regional, and domestic legal frameworks that have 
developed as a result of liberal influence. It is also worth discussing, 
in particular, the arguments liberal rights advocates have offered in 
support of homosexual rights in Africa and around the world. 
Traditional Lockean liberalism based its central claims on the 
fundamental, universal nature of all people. Specifically, Locke 
postulated that humans are naturally free, that humans are, in all 
morally significant ways, equal, and that people are rational.78 The 
claims of contemporary liberal human rights advocates continue to 
depend on these basic notions of equality and rationality at the heart 
of classical liberalism. From these basic shared attributes, two 
practical conclusions follow. First, if people are equal, then we must 
treat as morally and legally suspect any policy that favors some 
groups of people over others based on false claims of the inherent 
superiority of the favored group. Second, if we are all more or less 
rational, then each of us is likely to be best situated to determine her 
own best interests and to direct the course of her own life. 
The idea that all humans are equal and rational and, therefore, have 
essential rights to autonomy and to equal treatment under the law has 
guided liberal arguments since the Enlightenment, inspiring the work 
of modern philosophers as diverse as John Rawls, with his concern 
for distributive justice and equality of opportunity, and libertarians 
like Robert Nozick.79 In the United States and internationally, these 
two notions have led to the development of two lines of jurisprudence 
addressing discrimination and privacy/autonomy rights respectively. 
Each of these lines of cases lends potential support to claims by 
advocates for homosexual rights. 
A. Equal Protection 
In the United States—the source of much of the scholarship 
advocating for homosexual rights internationally, and a source of 
great influence on the development of the international human rights 
framework and of national constitutions throughout postcolonial 
Africa80—the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
78 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ¶¶ 4–5 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967). 
79 See, e.g., E. Vance Randall, Same-Sex Marriage and Education: Implications for 
Schools, Students, and Parents, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 385, 397–98 (2011). 
80 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
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2013] Western Universalism and African Homosexualities 335 
of the Constitution provided the basis for the twentieth century’s 
monumental Supreme Court decisions prohibiting official prejudice 
against blacks, women, and, on one occasion, homosexuals. The 
Declaration of Independence itself asserted the equality of men as a 
self-evident truth,81 but it took a civil war, passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and nearly another century of incremental social 
evolution before the nation truly began the process of living up to this 
ideal. Even in recent years, however, equal protection in the United 
States has proved a somewhat problematic route for advancing gay 
rights. Under the Supreme Court’s established framework for 
evaluating equal protection claims, official discrimination based on 
status other than race, religion, national origin, and gender has 
generally been permissible so long as the law passes rational basis 
review, the least demanding level of constitutional scrutiny. The 
Supreme Court in 1996 did strike down, using mere rational basis 
review, a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting 
governmental treatment of homosexuals as a protected class.82  
Similarly, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice 
O’Connor found Texas’s law prohibiting homosexual sodomy but not 
heterosexual sodomy to be irrationally discriminatory.83 Nevertheless, 
the Court has found most laws subject to rational basis scrutiny to be 
rationally related to some legitimate governmental purpose, thus 
passing constitutional muster under that lenient standard.84 
The future potential for use of equal protection arguments to 
advance homosexual standing in the United States is uncertain. In 
Windsor v. United States, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used 
intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, invalidating the Act as not substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose.85 Intermediate scrutiny, traditionally 
applied to gender86 and illegitimacy,87 offers significantly more 
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protection than rational basis review and could prove an attractive 
mechanism for striking discriminatory laws to promote homosexual 
rights. Additionally, in his 2010 decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
Federal District Court Judge Walker noted the history of stereotyping 
and discrimination against homosexuals and asserted that “gays and 
lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to 
protect.”88 Laws subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be 
necessary to a compelling government purpose and narrowly tailored 
to meet that purpose to be constitutionally valid, rarely survive the 
Court’s review.89 
Nonetheless, Judge Walker held it unnecessary to determine which 
standard of review applies to laws discriminating against 
homosexuals because, in his estimation, California’s constitutional 
provision prohibiting same-sex marriage failed even rational basis 
review.90 Although the Ninth Circuit’s narrower ruling in the case 
included no language suggesting homosexuals should benefit from 
strict scrutiny,91 the Supreme Court disposed of the case on standing 
grounds, leaving Judge Walker’s opinion intact.92 The Second 
Circuit’s holding in Windsor is, to date, the only federal case clearly 
holding that even intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws that 
discriminate against gays and lesbians. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Windsor contained equal protection language, but, ultimately, the 
standard of review and the basis for the decision were unclear. Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that DOMA was invalid because 
“no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage 
and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to 
protect in personhood and dignity,”93 suggesting without explicitly 
stating that the Court was using a rational basis standard of review. 
Additionally, the opinion contains some elements of substantive due 
process, protecting privacy and autonomy rights.94 Most importantly, 
however, the opinion’s treatment of federalism, suggesting DOMA’s 
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invalidity might be tied to the need to respect the sovereignty of states 
that have chosen to allow same-sex marriage,95 could mean that equal 
protection arguments will fail against states that have decided not to 
permit homosexual marriage. 
Internationally, equal protection arguments have had some limited 
success as a mechanism for advancing gay rights. The ratification of 
instrumental human rights covenants after World War II represented 
an embrace of liberalism and a turn away from the positivist 
philosophy that had previously dominated international law.96 The 
new post-war body of international human rights treaties included 
rights both to equal treatment and autonomy, the core guarantees of 
liberal philosophy. Each of the world’s three primary international 
human rights treaties—the International Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—establishes the right to freedom from 
official discrimination. 
The UDHR, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
the aftermath of the war, asserted that all people are “born free and 
equal in dignity and rights,”97 “that all are entitled to equal protection 
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
incitement to such discrimination,”98 and that all people are entitled to 
the rights set forth in the Declaration “without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”99 Later, the 
ICCPR echoed these ideas in its Article 26, urging that, “the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”100 The 
ICESCR provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant 
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undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present 
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind” based 
on categories identical to those enunciated in the UDHR and the 
ICCPR.101 
With 167 states parties to the ICCPR102 and 160 states parties to the 
ICESCR,103 nearly every country in the world has acceded to these 
conventions, including the vast majority of African nations.104 Yet it 
was unclear until the mid-1990s whether any of the nondiscrimination 
provisions of these instruments would be construed as protecting the 
rights of homosexuals. Of course, no one would seriously contend 
that any significant number of ratifying states would have understood 
the equal protection provisions of the ICCPR or the ICESCR at their 
inception in 1966 to safeguard the rights of homosexuals. 
Yet the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established a 
broader framework for interpretation of international agreements. 
Instead of concentrating solely on the actual intention of parties to a 
convention at the time of ratification, the Vienna Convention 
mandates that treaties be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”105 Moreover, as 
Professor Sophie Clavier has noted, there are compelling reasons to 
eschew a strictly intent-based approach to interpretation of human 
rights treaties in particular. Because such covenants uphold the rights 
of individuals against potential abuses of state power, the 
understandings of states themselves are less important than in the case 
of an ordinary treaty designed merely to advance the interests of the 
ratifying nations.106 
In any case, in 1994, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
established under the ICCPR to assess the compliance of ratifying 
 
101 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
102 United Nations Treaty Collection: International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4& 
chapter=4&lang=en. 
103 United Nations Treaty Collection: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter 
=4&lang=en. 
104 In Africa, only Western Sahara has failed to ratify the ICCPR, and only 
Mozambique, Western Sahara, and Zimbabwe have not ratified the ICESCR. 
105 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
106 Clavier, supra note 60, at 388–89. 
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nations,107 ruled for the first time that the ICCPR protects the right of 
homosexuals to be free from official discrimination.108 Although the 
Human Rights Committee’s opinions are nonbinding, they are highly 
persuasive interpretations of the ICCPR.109 In Toonen v. Australia, the 
Committee considered the claim of Nicholas Toonen that the 
Tasmanian Criminal Code’s proscription of private sexual contact 
between men violated Toonen’s right to equal protection under 
Article 26 of the Covenant.110 Because the Committee determined the 
Code provisions violated Toonen’s privacy rights under Article 17 of 
the Covenant, it found it unnecessary to decide whether homosexuals 
are a protected class under Article 26.111 Nonetheless, the Committee 
asserted that the treaty’s reference to sex as a protected class “is to be 
taken as including sexual orientation.”112 In making this 
determination, the Committee sidestepped Australia’s request for 
guidance on whether the term “any other status” in Article 26 might 
encompass homosexuals.113 
Since Toonen, the Committee has equivocated on whether it 
remains committed to interpreting sex as including sexual orientation 
under Article 26.114  The Committee did follow Toonen with a 2000 
decision in which it held Australia’s denial of pension benefits to the 
surviving same-sex partner of a war veteran violated Article 26 by 
discriminating against the complainant “on the basis of his sex or 
 
107 Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org 
/english/bodies/hrc/. 
108 Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994). 
109 HENRY J. STEINER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 915 (3d. ed. 2008) (quoting others describing the Human Rights 
Committee’s decisions as, “‘in effect, binding,’” despite the formally nonbinding nature of 
the Committee’s communications); Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual 
Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 
9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 82 (1996) (stating that parties to the ICCPR are bound by the 
text of the Covenant, rather than by decisions of the Human Rights Committee); Lorraine 
Finlay, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of 
Security Council Resolutions, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 477, 491 (2010) (noting that 
communications of the Human Rights Committee are nonbinding). 
110 Toonen, supra note 108, at 26. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Englander, supra note 20 (citing Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual 
Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the 
Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 216–17 (2008)). 
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sexual orientation.”115 However, even if this construction fails to 
garner continued support, the catchall “any other status” may be a 
viable avenue for the continued pursuit of homosexual rights against 
discrimination under the Covenant. 
Whatever avenue it takes, the Human Rights Committee has made 
clear in recent years its enduring commitment to preventing 
government discrimination against homosexuals as it has regularly 
urged reform from countries engaging in official discrimination or 
failing to provide sufficient mechanisms to prevent discriminatory 
practices.116 Likewise, the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has expressed its conviction that the 
ICESCR’s reference to “any other status” prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation.117 Finally, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, which conducts Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR) of 
the human rights records of all UN member states, has also included 
repeated recommendations by Council members for legal reform in 
countries that discriminate against gays and lesbians.118 In 2011, the 
Human Rights Council passed a resolution expressing “grave concern 
at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, 
committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and 
gender identity.”119 
Professor Clavier has argued that emerging international 
consensus, as reflected in decisions like Toonen and the now 
 
115 Young v Australia, UN GAOR, 78th Sess., Hum Rts Comm, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2000). 
116 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC), Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, Nov. 24, 2009, 
CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee 
Regarding the United States of America, Feb. 12, 2008, P25, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee Regarding Kenya, Mar. 24, 2005, P27, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/KEN; HRC, 
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2002, P19 U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY. 
117 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 
20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, P2, of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), P32, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009). 
118 See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review: Benin, A/HRC/22/9, Dec. 11, 2012; Human Rights Council, Report of 
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Nigeria, A/HRC/11/26, Oct. 5, 
2009; Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic 
Review: Uganda, A/HRC/19/16, Dec. 22, 2011; Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Zambia, A/HRC/22/13, Dec. 31, 2012. 
119 Human Rights Council Res. 17/19, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., 
May 31–June 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (June 15, 2011). 
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numerous declarations of national courts, regional courts, and UN 
treaty bodies, has rendered the principle of nondiscrimination against 
homosexuals a rule of customary international law.120 Clavier 
acknowledged the traditional notion that customary international law 
is not binding on persistent objectors and that a large number of 
countries, including many African nations, would clearly qualify as 
having persistently objected to the idea that homosexual activity 
should be protected.121 Nonetheless, Clavier asserted the strictly 
positivist view of international law, especially in the realm of human 
rights, is in decline and that, even if a rule has not attained status as a 
jus cogens norm, objection may no longer be sufficient to avoid being 
obligated to comply with the law.122 
This argument may be difficult to sustain.123 By definition, 
persistent objectors may opt out of customary international law, so 
long as the norm in question is not a jus cogens norm, and the 
evidence Professor Clavier marshaled in support of her assertion does 
not establish the claim. In support of her contention, Professor Clavier 
cited Roper v. Simmons,124 in which the United States Supreme Court 
abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders, and Lustig-Prean 
v. United Kingdom, in which the European Court of Human Rights 
found in favor of claimants who had been dismissed from the British 
Navy based on their sexual orientation.125 Clavier asserted the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper represented its recognition 
that, despite the country’s status as a persistent objector, international 
opinion demonstrated “the impossibility of objecting to the changing 
values of the international society.”126 Yet the Supreme Court clearly 
stated in its opinion that, while international opinion was persuasive, 
it was not controlling.127 Rather, according to the Court, international 
 
120 Clavier, supra note 60, at 401. 
121 Id. at 404–07. 
122 Id. at 403–07. 
123 But see Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of Love: Customary International Law and 
the Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 
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124 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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consensus merely confirmed the Court’s own conclusions.128 
Likewise, in Lustig-Prean, although the European Court of Human 
Rights stated that it could not ignore “widespread and consistently 
developing views or the legal changes in the domestic laws of 
Contracting States in favour of the admission of homosexuals into the 
armed forces of those States,” the Court’s determination ultimately 
turned on its holding that the United Kingdom had violated the 
privacy provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.129 
Even if Professor Clavier’s contention that persistent objection is no 
longer sufficient to avoid application of customary international law 
were to gain widespread support, however, the problems of 
enforcement endemic to international law in general would likely 
render such a conclusion largely academic for the time being. 
Regional human rights instruments offer language similar to that of 
international human rights documents, with potential to protect 
homosexuals against discrimination. In particular, the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights includes a broad anti-discrimination 
provision, with catchall protection for “other status,” mirroring the 
language in the ICCPR and the ICESCR.130 The African Charter, 
however, also limits the exercise of individual rights with reference to 
the duties individuals owe in exercising those rights, including the 
duty to exercise one’s rights with due regard for “morality and 
common interest.”131 The Charter also asserts that “[t]he promotion 
and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the 
community shall be the duty of the State.”132 Unsurprisingly, given 
prevailing cultural, moral, and legal norms in much of Africa, the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has never used the 
Charter to protect homosexual rights.133 
 
128 Id. 
129 Judgments in the Cases of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom and 
Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, supra note 125. 
130 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981, 1520 
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131 Id. art. 27. 
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133 In addition to these obstacles, the requirement that states parties submit to individual 
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African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, charged with interpreting Charter 
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Republic of Cameroon, May 11–25, 2005, P14, ACHPR, 39th Ordinary Sess. (2005). 
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In contrast to the African Court, regional human rights courts in 
other parts of the world have issued definitive rulings protecting 
homosexual rights. In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect classification 
under the American Convention on Human Rights, invalidating the 
Chilean Supreme Court’s denial of a mother’s custody of her children 
on the basis of her homosexuality.134 Likewise, the European Court of 
Human Rights has repeatedly cited the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ nondiscrimination provision as a basis for striking 
down laws that discriminated against homosexuals.135 
Nondiscrimination provisions in African constitutions also offer 
some potential for protection of homosexuals. Most African 
constitutions, unlike the United States Constitution, tend to list 
categories of people protected from discrimination. The constitutions 
of some African nations include broad catchall protections for “other 
status,” or its functional equivalent, similar to the language of 
international human rights documents.136 Others that do not contain 
 
134 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Inter-Am Ct HR (judgment of Feb 24, 2012), 
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favouritism are eradicated”); art. 13(5) (“For the purposes of this Article the expression 
‘discriminate’ means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons 
on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, 
sex or station in life such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior 
and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are 
treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified 
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such language nonetheless prohibit sex discrimination,137 which a 
court could construe to constrain the state from discriminating against 
homosexuals, as did the Human Rights Committee in Toonen. But the 
dominant cultural antagonism toward homosexuality in societies 
across the continent may make significant progress through judicial 
interpretation of constitutional prohibitions on discrimination as 
unlikely as such victories would have been in the United States for 
most of its history. In fact, several African constitutions include 
explicit exceptions to their fundamental rights provisions when 
reasonably necessary to preserve public morality.138 Such provisions 
suggest, at the least, a lower probability of a judicial determination 
like that of the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas in 
its finding that moral disapproval of a practice by a majority of the 
population is insufficient grounds for upholding a law prohibiting the 
practice.139 
The liberal right to equal protection of the law does not, of course, 
guarantee freedom from discrimination on any basis whatsoever. If a 
state were not able to enact laws and policies that distinguish between 
some groups of people for some purposes, an incredibly broad range 
of law would be rendered invalid. Governments would be unable, for 
example, to implement age restrictions on voting and driving or to 
treat unlicensed opticians differently from sellers of ready-to-wear 
 
shall not be construed in a manner that will prohibit the Government from taking 
purposeful steps aimed at rectifying disabilities in the society”). 
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welfare in a democratic society.”); CONST. OF ETHIOPIA, art. 26(3) (noting that the 
government may restrict the right of privacy in the interest of “. . . public peace, public 
health and morality. . .”); CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 23(7) (referring to other provisions that 
allow limitations when reasonably required “in the interests of defence, public safety, 
public order, public morality or public health”). 
139 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003).(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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eyeglasses.140 Instead, courts and scholars have interpreted the right to 
equal treatment under the law as a right to be free from unreasonable 
discrimination. This inquiry has required two significant 
determinations. First, courts must decide whether the person claiming 
unlawful discrimination is a member of a group that merits special 
protection. The enumeration of prohibited forms of discrimination in 
most international human rights documents makes the first 
determination straightforward in many cases. However, when 
confronting an unenumerated form of discrimination, a court must 
determine whether, in the case of an instrument like the ICCPR, it is 
possible to bring the group under the umbrella of an explicitly listed 
category,141 or, alternatively, whether the group has the kind of “other 
status” worthy of special protection. In the United States, where the 
Equal Protection Clause does not mention any particular protected 
category, the Supreme Court has looked to whether there has been a 
history of discrimination against a discrete and insular minority142 on 
the basis of an immutable characteristic143 in deciding whether laws 
discriminating against the group in question should be subject to 
increased scrutiny. 
Hence, as mentioned above, discrimination based on some 
unremarkable status, like being an unlicensed optician, would be 
reasonable so long as the reviewing court finds it rationally related to 
any legitimate government purpose, in practice an extremely low bar 
to a finding of legitimacy. On the other hand, in the United States, a 
law that differentiates on the basis of race, an immutable trait and a 
category with an obviously fraught history, including terribly abusive 
discrimination, will be subject to strict scrutiny.144 Courts and other 
human rights bodies interpreting the requirements of non-
discrimination clauses in treaties and national constitutions might 
agree with Judge Walker’s assessment that a law that discriminates on 
the basis of sexual orientation is precisely the kind of law to which 
something akin to strict scrutiny should apply. As I will discuss 
below, however, to the extent that cultural beliefs and anthropological 
data undermine claims of immutability and assertions of status as a 
discrete, insular minority, such findings are less likely. 
 
140 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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143 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
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Even if a court determines a group is entitled to protected status, it 
must ultimately still make a finding on the question of whether a 
discriminatory law is reasonable. A law distinguishing between 
people on the basis of a suspect classification is less likely to 
withstand scrutiny, but its incompatibility with the right to 
nondiscrimination is not a foregone conclusion. Hence, although 
discrimination on the basis of race is presumptively invalid, there are 
limited circumstances in which modern courts have concluded racial 
discrimination is reasonable.145 Likewise, a decision that sexual 
orientation is a suspect classification might not lead to the inevitable 
invalidation of all laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and 
homosexuals. It could, for example, result in the overturning of laws 
that criminalize homosexual activity, as in Toonen, while preserving 
prohibitions on homosexual marriage. As of early 2013, although 
only ten countries had fully allowed same-sex marriage,146 a much 
larger group of nations, including the United States, has 
decriminalized consensual sexual relationships between members of 
the same sex.147 
Ultimately, while international human rights bodies are likely to 
continue to interpret international human rights documents as 
providing special protection against discrimination for homosexuals, 
domestic courts of countries throughout Africa are much less likely to 
share that perspective. As I will discuss in further detail below, the 
undeveloped framework for enforcement of international human 
rights treaties means that, in practice, the perspectives of national 
decision-making bodies will prevail in the event of conflict between 
the views of a body like the Human Rights Committee and those of 
domestic judges and legislators. First, however, I will consider the 
 
145 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of 
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European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1. In the future, the Treaty of Lisbon 
may serve as a basis for further advancement of homosexual marriage rights in Europe. 
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development of the second foundational liberal right—the right to 
individual autonomy, often framed as a right to privacy. 
B. Autonomy 
Locke’s belief in the universality of human rationality supported 
not only the idea that government must treat people equally, but also 
the notion that the state should generally leave people alone. If people 
are all essentially rational, then each person is roughly as capable as 
the next of deciding how to order his own life, and each person is 
likely to be in a better position than anyone else to determine his own 
interests and to choose how to pursue his own vision of what 
constitutes a good life.148 Like the right to nondiscrimination, United 
States constitutional jurisprudence, international human rights 
treaties, regional human rights instruments, and the constitutions of 
African nations have enshrined the rights to privacy and autonomy. 
In the United States, the Declaration of Independence reflected this 
liberal value in its affirmation that, like equality of men, it was a self-
evident truth that men had unalienable rights, including the right to 
“Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”149 The First and Second 
(under current interpretation)150 Amendments to the United States 
Constitution safeguard particularized forms of individual autonomy—
the right to freedom of expression and association and the right to 
bear arms, respectively. However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of a broader, more generalized right to autonomy began in earnest 
with the now discredited line of early twentieth century substantive 
due process decisions overturning labor laws on the theory that such 
laws interfered with the fundamental right to economic liberty.151 The 
Supreme Court would later resurrect the concept of substantive due 
process to protect unenumerated autonomy rights in a different 
context, with its line of privacy cases beginning in the 1960s with 
Griswold v. Connecticut.152 These cases upheld as fundamental to 
ordered liberty the right to contraceptives for married153 and 
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unmarried people,154 the right to abortion,155 the right to have 
children,156 and the right of people of different races to marry each 
other.157 Finally, in 2003, the Court in Lawrence used the idea of 
substantive due process to invalidate a Texas law that criminalized 
sodomy between same-sex couples.158 
Just as Judge Walker’s opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
invalidated California’s constitutional prohibition of same-sex 
marriage on the ground that it violated the federal Equal Protection 
Clause, Judge Walker also held California’s constitutional 
amendment infringed the federal substantive due process rights of 
homosexual couples.159 Just as the Ninth Circuit had avoided 
determining whether homosexuals might be entitled to heightened or 
strict scrutiny for equal protection purposes, Judge Reinhardt’s 
opinion for the Ninth Circuit eschewed the due process issue 
altogether.160 The Supreme Court’s opinion in the case left Judge 
Walker’s opinion undisturbed,161 and its opinion in Windsor, 
invalidating DOMA, also included substantive due process strands, in 
addition to its equal protection and federalism rationales.162 
International human rights documents also guarantee autonomy 
rights, just as they assert the fundamental right to nondiscrimination. 
The UDHR contains numerous provisions proclaiming autonomy 
rights, including a right against arbitrary interference with one’s 
privacy, family, and home,163 the right to freedom of movement,164 the 
right to marry and found a family,165 the right to choose one’s 
employment,166 and rights to freedom of religion,167 opinion and 
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expression,168 and association.169 The ICCPR contains many similar 
terms.170 While the UDHR and ICCPR’s guarantees of a right to 
marry might eventually be interpreted to encompass a right to 
homosexual marriage,171 for now, the more generalized protection of 
autonomy rights in the documents’ privacy provisions offers greater 
potential to shield homosexuals against governmental oppression. 
This is so at least in part because of existing precedent. As 
mentioned above, the Human Rights Committee’s decision in Toonen 
ultimately turned on the determination that the Tasmanian Criminal 
Code’s prohibition of private, consensual sexual activity between men 
violated Toonen’s privacy rights under Article 17 of the Covenant. Of 
course, while the right to marriage is facially narrower than a right 
against interference with privacy, family, and home life, a finding that 
homosexuals have the right to marry each other would axiomatically 
include the kinds of sexual autonomy rights more conventionally 
enforced through privacy provisions. Yet, as with equal protection, 
the path to marriage rights through autonomy provisions may be more 
fraught than claims that criminalization of private sexual conduct 
infringes fundamental autonomy or privacy rights. 
Like their international counterparts, regional human rights 
instruments also include protections of individual autonomy. For 
African countries, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
safeguards autonomy rights with provisions analogous to those of 
international human rights documents like the UDHR and the 
ICCPR.172 Notably, unlike the UDHR and the ICCPR, however, the 
African Charter contains no article offering general protection for 
 
168 Id. art. 19. 
169 Id. art. 20. 
170 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 12 (guaranteeing freedom of movement); art. 
17 (protecting against arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home); art. 18 
(guaranteeing “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion”); art. 19 (asserting rights to 
freedom of opinion and expression); art. 21 (guaranteeing a right to peaceful assembly); 
art. 23 (proclaiming the right of “men and women of marriageable age to marry and to 
found a family”). 
171 The UDHR and ICCPR’s proclamations of a right of “men and women” to marry 
might well be interpreted more narrowly, as assuring only that men and women have a 
right to marry each other. UDHR, supra note 97, art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 23. 
Article 16 of the UDHR, specifically notes the right shall be “without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion,” but does not, of course, mention sexual orientation, a notion 
that would not have occurred to the document’s drafters at its inception. 
172 African Charter, supra note 130, art. 8 (guaranteeing freedom of conscience and 
religion); art. 9 (protecting freedom to hold and express opinions); art. 10 (stating that 
individuals have freedom of association); art 11 (proclaiming freedom of assembly); art 12 
(describing a right to freedom of movement). 
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privacy or home life. Thus, a decision completely analogous to the 
European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom that criminalization of homosexual sex violates the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ privacy provisions,173 would 
be untenable. 
In addition to the limitation that individuals owe a duty to exercise 
rights with regard to morality and the common interest and the duty of 
the state to promote morals and traditional values, several of the 
African Charter’s autonomy provisions include specific limitations in 
the interests of public welfare or law and order.174 It is conceivable, 
however, that the Charter’s articles ensuring freedom of conscience, 
expression, and association might someday be construed as offering 
protection to homosexuals, like the “penumbras” and “emanations” 
from the First Amendment the Griswold Court found supporting the 
right of married couples to contraceptive devices.175 
Finally, African constitutions include fundamental rights 
provisions assuring protection of privacy and autonomy. Like the 
international and regional human rights instruments discussed above, 
these rights tend to be fairly specifically enumerated, in contrast to the 
open-ended possibilities for jurisprudential evolution in the United 
States Supreme Court’s line of substantive due process cases.176 And 
while the privacy provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR, with their 
references to “privacy, family, and home,” can comfortably 
encompass fairly broad autonomy claims, the privacy articles in some 
African constitutions appear to target particular categories of privacy 
rights with more precision, often with a focus on physical searches of 
the home and other interferences with property interests.177 In these 
 
173 Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981). 
174 African Charter, supra note 130, art. 8 (noting the right to freedom of conscience is 
subject to “law and order”); art. 9 (stating that the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression must be “within the law”); art. 10 (asserting that individuals have a right to free 
association only if they abide by the law); art. 11 (stating that the right to freedom of 
assembly may be restricted “in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics 
and rights and freedoms of others”). 
175 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
176 See, e.g., CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 19 (articulating a right to freedom of thought and 
religion); art. 20 (providing for freedom of expression); art. 21 (describing a right to free 
assembly and association); art. 22 (stating that “no citizen shall be deprived of his freedom 
of movement”). 
177 See, e.g., CONST. OF MALAWI, art. 21 (providing protection against searches of 
“person, home or property” and “the seizure of private possessions”); CONST. OF 
UGANDA, art. 27 (describing a right to privacy of “person, home, and other property,” and 
stating that “No person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person’s 
home, correspondence, communication or other property”); CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 17(1)  
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countries, direct reliance on privacy protections would likely be more 
difficult for claimants asserting unenumerated rights to sexual 
autonomy. 
Again, one might make a Griswold-like argument, based on 
“penumbras” and “emanations” from articles ensuring privacy and 
freedom of expression and association. Although the Griswold Court 
did not explicitly invoke substantive due process, subsequent cases 
made clear that doctrine provided the foundation for the developing 
body of American fundamental rights jurisprudence;178 it is 
theoretically possible that some African courts might be willing to use 
similar doctrinal innovation to proclaim unenumerated rights. 
Nonetheless, African courts have not tended to develop similarly 
convenient mechanisms for extrapolation of general, fundamental 
rights from more specific constitutional provisions. As a consequence, 
practitioners of same-sex intimacies in many African countries might 
face obstacles to constitutional autonomy arguments even if judges in 
those countries were predisposed to be sympathetic to their claims. 
As with equal protection, not all autonomy claims attract the kind 
of elevated scrutiny that increases the odds that a law impinging on 
the asserted right will fail to withstand judicial review. In the United 
States, for example, substantive due process claims merit strict 
scrutiny only if the right at issue is considered fundamental, a 
standard the United States Supreme Court finds satisfied when there 
is a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty 
interest;”179 when the claimed right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,”180 “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental;”181 and when the right is 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty 
nor justice would exist” without it.182 Whether courts in the United 
States and elsewhere will examine homosexual marriage claims and 
 
(“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or 
his property or the entry by others on his premises”); but see CONST. OF CAMEROON, art. 
12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence”); CONST. OF KENYA, art. 31 (including protection of information relating 
to “family or private affairs”); CONST. OF TANZANIA, art. 16(1) (stating that “[e]very 
person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his 
family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private 
communications”). 
178 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
179 Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
180 Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
181 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
182 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
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sexual autonomy claims based on fundamental rights provisions using 
strict scrutiny, or something like strict scrutiny, will depend in large 
part on how narrowly those courts define the right at stake. 
If one characterizes the ostensible right as a right to gay marriage, 
for example, then it becomes considerably more difficult to argue the 
right is deeply rooted in tradition and history. On the other hand, if 
courts are willing to classify the right at stake more broadly, as a right 
to choose one’s spouse, such contentions are more plausible. 
Likewise, claims of rights to sexual autonomy, broadly speaking, are 
more likely to be found to be deeply rooted in tradition than claims of 
rights to homosexual sexual intimacy. Of course, a court’s 
determination on how to frame the claimed right is likely to depend 
largely on the outcome the judges deciding the case favor.183 So far, in 
any case, courts around the world have been significantly more likely 
to afford protection against governmental proscription of consensual 
sexual intimacy than to find a fundamental right to homosexual 
marriage.184 
And as with equal protection, even a finding that the right in 
question is fundamental, thus requiring something like strict scrutiny, 
does not definitively lead to invalidation of any law that places 
restrictions on the right. Thus, a court might find a fundamental right 
to sexual autonomy or to marriage, but might then conclude that 
restrictions aimed at homosexuals are reasonable in light of 
compelling governmental interests.185 These sorts of restrictive 
findings are, of course, more likely in a society culturally predisposed 
to disfavor homosexuality. 
Finally, as already discussed, fundamental rights provisions in 
African constitutions often include specific public-interest exceptions, 
 
183 The United States Supreme Court engaged in just such a debate in Lawrence. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy sidestepped the question of whether the rights at stake 
were “deeply rooted” in the country’s history and traditions and whether strict scrutiny 
was the applicable standard, but described the claimed right fairly broadly, as a right to 
“private sexual conduct.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Scalia’s dissent, 
on the other hand, described the asserted right more narrowly, as a right to “homosexual 
sodomy,” and noted the majority did not even try to claim that right was “deeply rooted” 
in history and tradition. Id. at 594. In Bowers, the majority had framed the issue in 
similarly narrow terms, as a question of whether “the Constitution confers a fundamental 
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . .” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 
(1986). 
184 See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text. 
185 Such a finding would be inconsistent with Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence, 
in which he held the government had no rational basis, let alone a compelling interest, in 
criminalizing homosexual sex. Nonetheless, it is certain that not all jurists would agree 
with Kennedy’s reasoning. 
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including exceptions for the enforcement of moral norms.186 Although 
the United States Supreme Court held that moral disapproval of 
homosexual activity by a majority of the population was insufficient 
to justify upholding a law criminalizing such activity,187 and although 
the Human Rights Committee rejected the Tasmanian argument that 
criminalization of homosexual sex was justified to preserve public 
health and morals,188 it is likely that many African courts would be 
more receptive to such contentions.189 In African countries with more 
generalized privacy protections in their constitutions, and without 
explicit limitations for things like public morality, privacy claims 
might be more likely avenues for advancing the rights of 
homosexuals. Even in such countries, however, prevailing cultural 
norms make such claims significantly less likely to succeed than in 
Western societies. I will discuss the reasons for this contention in 
further detail in Part IV. 
C. Enforcement 
Even if one concludes that international human rights law supports 
privacy and nondiscrimination rights protecting homosexuals, the 
problem of enforcement of those rights, like the problem of 
enforcement of international law more broadly, remains a serious 
obstacle to realization of any improvement in the status of 
homosexuals in Africa. The Human Rights Committee’s powers are 
limited for several important reasons. First, only states that have 
ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR have accepted the 
Committee’s authority to offer opinions on complaints from 
individuals claiming their rights have been violated. Although 114 
nations have acceded to the First Optional Protocol, many of the 
countries that have failed to offer homosexuals the full range of rights 
available to heterosexuals have not, including the United States and 
numerous countries in Africa with discriminatory laws.190 Even if a 
 
186 See, e.g., CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 17(2) (stating that, notwithstanding the Article’s 
first clause prohibiting searches without consent, government conduct will not contravene 
the Article if it is reasonably required in the “interests of defence, public safety, public 
order, public morality, public health . . .” or to protect the “rights and freedoms of other 
persons”). 
187 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
188 Toonen, supra note 108. 
189 See infra Part IV. 
190 United Nations Treaty Collection: First Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx 
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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country endorses the First Optional Protocol, the Protocol provides 
that any party to it may denounce the Protocol with written notice, 
though without prejudice to communications received before the 
effective date of denunciation.191 Ultimately, the Human Rights 
Committee’s authority is limited by the failure to establish any 
sanction whatsoever for failing to comply with its recommendations. 
In fact, as noted above, the Committee’s opinions are not formally 
binding at all.192 This is so even for those countries that have acceded 
to the First Optional Protocol.193 
Although Australia responded to the Committee’s report in Toonen 
by passing federal legislation to overturn the Tasmanian law and 
prohibiting the passage of future similar laws,194 Australia was in a 
somewhat unusual position in its sympathy for the complainant and 
refusal to support the Tasmanian government’s law before the 
Committee. In response to the complaint, Australia had conceded the 
Tasmanian law arbitrarily interfered with Toonen’s privacy rights, 
was not justified on public health or morals grounds, and that if “other 
status” could be read to include sexual orientation, the Tasmanian law 
unjustifiably discriminated against homosexuals.195 At the time, 
Tasmania was the only state in Australia that continued to criminalize 
homosexual conduct.196 
Even if a country has not ratified the First Optional Protocol, the 
Human Rights Committee has the competence to review regular 
reports by states parties to the ICCPR on the status of their 
compliance with the Covenant and to hear complaints between states 
parties to the Covenant.197 Again, however, the Committee has no 
 
191 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res.. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 
U.N.T.S. 302, art. 12.FN 192. 
192 See Toonen, supra note 108. 
193 Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times 
of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 127 (2005) (noting 
that Article 5(4) of the Protocol provides the Committee with authority only to “forward 
its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual”); c.f. Darina Makova, Chapter 
19 Human Rights in Times of Global Inequalities: A View from Slovakia, 16 IUS GENTIUM 
325, 329 (2012) (describing the ICCPR, “when taken with its 1st Optional Protocol,” as 
“substantially binding and practically enforceable”). 
194 See Gus Bernardi, From Conflict to Convergence: The Evolution of Tasmanian 
Anti-Discrimination Law, 7(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 134 (2001). 
195 Toonen, supra note 108. 
196 Id. 
197 Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr 
.org/english/bodies/hrc/. 
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power to sanction states it determines to be in violation of their 
obligations under the Covenant. Ultimately, states parties to the 
ICCPR are bound by the text of the Covenant, rather than by 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee,198 and states whose judges 
are predisposed against homosexuality will be less likely to interpret 
the ICCPR’s language as providing protection for homosexual rights. 
The ICESCR faces similar enforcement problems. 
Likewise, even if a UN member state fails entirely to cooperate 
with the Human Rights Council’s UPR, there is no definite sanction. 
Rather, the Council “would decide on the measures it would need to 
take in case of persistent non-co-operation.”199 Enforcement problems 
have also plagued the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
given the nonbinding status of the Commission’s recommendations.200 
Moreover, without state consent, individuals are not empowered to 
bring claims before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.201 
In light of the limited capacity for implementation of human rights 
norms outside the machinery of a state justice system, the ICCPR 
itself recognizes the important role of states parties in its statement of 
the obligation of national governments to give effect to rights 
recognized under the Covenant.202 The ICESCR contains a similar 
provision.203 Of course, reliance on member nations to give effect to 
treaty rights leaves such nations with considerable practical power to 
 
198 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human 
Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
61, 82 (1996). 
199 Basic Facts About the UPR, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/BasicFacts.aspx. 
200 See, e.g., Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance With the 
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994–2004, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2007) (finding a general lack of state compliance with the non-
binding recommendations of the Commission). 
201 Article 34(6) of the protocol establishing the Court requires states parties to accept 
the competence of the court to hear claims from individuals and Non-Governmental 
Organizations in order for the Court to hear such claims. Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 9, 1998, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/665 (entered into force 
Jan. 1, 2004). As of early 2013, only six African nations (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, 
Malawi, Rwanda, and Tanzania) had chosen to allow individual claims against them in the 
Court. Rwanda Deposits the Declaration Allowing Individuals Direct Access to the Court, 
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.african    
-court.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/341-rwanda-deposits-the-article-34-6-declara 
tion-allowing-individuals-and-ngos-direct-access-to-the-african-court. 
202 ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 2. 
203 ICESCR, supra note 101, art. 3. 
356 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 315 
interpret the nature of the rights at stake. Given pervasive obstacles to 
the enforcement of international law generally, and given the lack of 
any specific enforcement mechanism for international human rights 
treaties in particular, appeals to international human rights norms to 
promote the interests of homosexuals in Africa currently have limited 
potential for success. 
Favorable decisions from domestic courts in Africa also seem 
unlikely. As others have observed in the American context, contrary 
to the popular mythology of courts as staunch defenders of minority 
rights against majoritarian oppression, courts seldom declare rights 
that lack significant public support.204 On the occasions when courts 
do find rights when there is substantial public disagreement on the 
issue, backlash to judicial interference with the political process may 
lead to subversion of the very rights courts hoped to protect.205 The 
widespread public disapproval of homosexuality in Africa suggests 
African courts are unlikely to issue sweeping decisions to protect 
homosexual rights. Even if African courts did issue such rulings, 
moreover, lack of African public support for homosexual rights 
suggests the possibility for political backlash that could endanger 
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa more than 
current laws criminalizing homosexual conduct. These conclusions 
seem apparent even without any deeper examination of ideas outside 
the liberal legal paradigm or of cultural context. However, both queer 
theory and communitarian philosophy, and the coincidence of those 
ideologies with much of the African anthropological record, suggest 
more powerful reasons both to discount the likelihood of favorable 
 
204 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 
VA. L. REV. 1537, 1551–52 (2004) (arguing that courts tend to protect minority rights only 
when national majorities approve of such protection); Barry Friedman, The Importance of 
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 
1279 (2004) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court “operates on a leash” that 
ensures its decisions will hew fairly closely to public opinion); Michael J. Klarman, Brown 
and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 445 (2005) [hereinafter Klarman, 
Brown and Lawrence]. Adem K Abebe, Abdication of Responsibility or Justifiable Fear of 
Illegitimacy? The Death Penalty, Gay Rights, and the Role of Public Opinion in Judicial 
Determinations in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 603, 620–26 (2012) (Adem Abebe has 
observed that in the few cases in which African courts have considered rights-based claims 
by practitioners of same-sex intimacies, most of those courts have relied heavily on public 
opinion in rejecting the claims.). 
205 Ruth Bader Ginsburg has argued, for example, that Roe v. Wade produced backlash 
that has made abortion reform more difficult. Emily Bazelon, Backlash Whiplash: Is 
Justice Ginsburg Right that Roe v. Wade Should Make the Court Cautious About Gay 
Marriage?, SLATE, May 14, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics 
/jurisprudence/2013/05/justice_ginsburg_and_roe_v_wade_caution_for_gay_marriage 
.html. 
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judicial opinions and to credit the possibility of severe popular 
backlash to outside pressure for homosexual rights in Africa. 
III 
CRITIQUES OF LIBERALISM 
The poorly developed framework for the enforcement of 
international human rights law suggests practical limitations on 
improving the lives of homosexuals in Africa, but there are other 
reasons for liberals to consider exercising restraint in pursuing a 
homosexual rights agenda in Africa. There are always risks to 
pursuing a liberal agenda in a culture other than one’s own, yet 
Professor Uday Metha’s observation of an exclusionary impulse 
inherent to classical liberal ideology may suggest interventionist 
tendencies are inextricably entwined with liberal theory. In Mehta’s 
estimation, despite the universalism at the core of liberal philosophy, 
liberalism’s exclusionary potential was apparent even in Locke’s 
articulations of the distinction between “universal capacities and the 
conditions for their actualization.”206 In particular, Mehta has claimed 
a discrepancy between Locke’s assertion of the natural and universal 
capacity for reason, which individuals might use to ascertain the 
natural laws that restrict otherwise complete human freedom, and the 
highly structured process Locke envisioned for inculcating this 
universal rationality in children in his Thoughts Concerning 
Education.207 Thus, having described reason as universal and natural, 
Locke nonetheless endorsed the notion that certain members of 
society (children) could be excluded from access to the full range of 
liberal rights until society had imparted rationality to them through a 
highly regimented educational curriculum.208 Mehta has also noted 
Locke’s frequent approving references to conventional social 
hierarchies that impose limitations on the theoretically universal 
access to liberal rights he proclaimed.209 In Thoughts Concerning 
Education, for example, Locke wrote, “I think a Prince, a Nobleman 
and an ordinary Gentleman’s son, should have different ways of 
breeding.”210 And of course, for Locke, there were some members of 
 
206 Uday S. Mehta, Liberal Strategies of Exclusion, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE: 
COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 62 (Frederick Cooper & Ann L. Stole 
eds., 1997). 
207 Id. at 67–70. 
208 Id. at 67 (citing LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ¶ 60). 
209 Id. at 69. 
210 Id. at 67 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 
section 217). 
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society—“lunaticks and ideots”211—whom the majority could 
permanently govern without consent. 
But for Mehta, the imperialist potential of liberalism was most 
evident in the writing of John Stuart Mill.212 Although Mill insisted 
that liberty was necessary for human flourishing,213 Mill believed in 
limiting access to liberty not only for children and lunatics, but also 
for societies that had not developed sufficiently to be “improved by 
free and equal discussion.”214 Thus, despite Mill’s belief in the 
universal human sense of dignity, and the capacity for choice as a 
“distinctive endowment of a human being,” he endorsed despotic 
colonial rule over what he considered barbarous cultures. Mill 
justified authoritarian rule by contrasting societies that were “capable 
and ripe for representative government” like Australia and the 
American colonies, with others, like India, that were “still a great 
distance from that state.”215 
More generally, Mehta has noted that liberal universalism leads to 
an urge to “politically . . . assimilate things, even when those things 
are thoroughly unfamiliar.”216 This “cosmopolitanism of reason” leads 
liberals to describe the unknown in generalities, which, “in a single 
glance and without having experienced any of it . . . make[s] it 
possible to compare and classify the world.”217 Mehta’s observation 
of the liberal urge toward political assimilation perfectly describes 
insistence by many Western liberals on engrafting Western 
homosexual identity onto all practitioners of same-sex intimacies. But 
this epistemological perspective results, in Mehta’s view, in an urge 
to dominate other cultures, for “the language of those comparisons is 
not neutral and cannot avoid notions of superiority and inferiority, 
backward and progressive, and higher and lower.”218 
Of course, current liberal calls for advancement of homosexual 
rights in Africa are arguably a far cry from the colonial policies of an 
invading empire. The publicity campaigns of human rights groups 
today do not bolster physical occupations by foreign powers, the way 
 
211 LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ¶ 60). 
212 Mehta, supra note 206 at 70–80. 
213 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
214 Id. 
215 Mehta, supra note 206, at 76 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 214 (1861)). 
216 UDAY S. MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY 
BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 20 (1999). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
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that European nations used abolition of the slave trade to justify their 
nineteenth-century colonial enterprises.219 And conditioning 
dispensation of monetary assistance on protection of a vulnerable 
minority seems far removed from using the notion of cultural 
inferiority to rationalize occupation, wealth extraction, and the 
wholesale subjugation of populations that characterized the colonial 
experience. 
On the other hand, the push for legal Westernization has gone hand 
in hand with pressure from international institutions like the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund for developing countries to 
move toward economic liberalization,220 thereby creating new 
investment opportunities for the West, and others. In theory, the 
economic liberalization implemented through World Bank-imposed 
structural adjustment programs will lead developing countries out of 
poverty.221 The attendant Western systems call for legal 
liberalization—the reshaping of non-Western legal systems to fit 
American and European conceptions of justice—compliments that 
economic liberalization; without such legal reform, the theory goes, 
developing countries will be unable to attract the investment that is 
crucial to increasing their wealth, and, of course, the wealth of 
investors in their newly open economies.222 
Yet even if one is disinclined to read mixed motives into the 
appeals of human rights activists, there are important reasons for 
liberals to proceed with caution. As Professor Thomas Kelley has 
chronicled, Western pressure for liberal legal reform in developing 
countries may result in outcomes at odds with reformers’ intentions. 
In a devastating account, Kelley described the plight of Niger’s 
horso.223 Descendents of chattel slaves who hold a status difficult to 
describe in Western terms, horso have traditionally farmed land 
remitted to them by village nobles, paying for the privilege with a 
portion of their harvests.224 Although, unlike their ancestors, horso 
have a great deal of freedom, they hold a permanent child-like status 
 
219 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in 
Niger: Harming Contemporary Slaves by Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 
999, n.52 (2008) [hereinafter Kelley, Slavery]. 
220 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World: The 
Troubling Case of Niger, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 321, 322 (2007) [hereinafter 
Kelley, Exporting Western Law]. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Kelley, Slavery, supra note 219. 
224 Id. at 1013–16. 
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in the communities in which they live, always dependent on noble 
elders for permission to cultivate land.225 As Kelley has described, a 
combination of recent, Western-inspired property reforms and anti-
slavery provisions has, ironically, had significant negative impacts for 
Niger’s horso. First, antislavery provisions in Niger’s constitution and 
penal code, defining slavery in Western terms as involving “powers 
attaching to the right of ownership,” are unfamiliar in a culture in 
which all individuals owe duties to, and exert some ownership-like 
claims over, other members of the communities in which they live.226 
However, these provisions have led some nobles to assert that they 
neither own horso nor owe them any further duties, including the 
protection and care they have traditionally felt obligated to offer.227 
Second, property reforms aimed at ensuring clear titles to land, 
eviscerating communal ownership to ensure alienability, have led 
nobles to assert sole ownership claims over land they had traditionally 
ceded for horso use, leaving horso communities isolated and 
defenseless.228 
Kelley’s powerful account of the plight of the horso followed his 
earlier and more generalized admonitions about the possible 
unintended consequences of Western legal reform in the developing 
world.229 Given the depth of Western misunderstanding of African 
culture, Western efforts to advance homosexual rights in Africa could 
also lead to unanticipated results. 
While the range of critiques of liberalism is too extensive to 
catalogue here, two responses to the liberal legal perspective—
communitarianism and queer theory—are particularly relevant to any 
investigation of African resistance to gay rights. These philosophies, 
along with the African anthropological record, can help explain why 
African countries, which tend to have constitutions that espouse the 
same liberal values as the constitutions of Western nations, might be 
so much less likely than their Western counterparts to interpret 
fundamental rights provisions as protecting homosexuals. 
Communitarian theory, which embraces elevation of community 
norms over individual interests, coincides with the values of a broad 
array of African cultures and helps elucidate the likely obstacles 
homosexual rights advocates will face in Africa. While 
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communitarian theory can shed some light on African resistance to 
both autonomy and equality claims of homosexual rights advocates, 
the anti-essentialist assertions of queer theorists have significant 
implications in particular for liberal claims based on rights against 
discrimination. If, as queer theorists contend, sexuality is primarily a 
social construction, then assertions that homosexuals have the kind of 
minority status that merits protection against discriminatory conduct 
become less tenable. Similarly, if the consequence of the malleability 
and variability of desire is that many Africans who engage in what 
Westerners would term homosexual conduct consider that conduct a 
relatively insignificant component not only of their overall identities, 
but an unimportant component even of their sexual identities, then 
claims to the kind of suspect status that might confer legal protection 
against discrimination become more difficult. As I will discuss in Part 
V, much of the anthropological data from across the African continent 
supports the anti-essentialist arguments of queer theorists. 
The claims of communitarians and queer theorists, and the 
consistency of those claims with cultural data across the African 
continent, should be important to anyone committed to a liberal 
perspective. These assertions, and their affirmation in African culture, 
offer insight on the likely depth of African backlash against liberal 
arguments for homosexual rights. The perspectives of 
communitarians and queer theorists also offer the possibility of a 
deeper understanding of the context for African assertions about 
homosexuality. In turn, such an understanding may assist homosexual 
rights advocates in pursuing a more successful agenda for improving 
the lives of Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies. 
A. Communitarian Philosophy and African Culture 
Given that African constitutions tend to enshrine liberal 
commitments similar to their Western counterparts, one might 
reasonably wonder why African citizens, legislators, and judges 
would be any less likely than their Western counterparts to uphold the 
liberal values inherent to the claims of homosexual rights advocates. 
A simple and obvious answer is that many African cultures remain 
significantly less sympathetic to homosexuality than most Western 
cultures, which have had a rapid evolution in perspective on 
homosexuality and homosexual rights. Yet this answer, by itself, is 
insufficient. If, in fact, the constitutions of African countries represent 
a wholehearted commitment to liberal values, then those constitutions 
should guide the judges who interpret them to separate the right from 
the good, upholding the former by striking down laws that represent 
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popular sentiment concerning the latter. Liberalism, that is, does not 
allow majoritarian interference with individual decisions about how to 
pursue a happy life in the absence of significant interference with the 
rights of others.230 
What, then, explains illiberal decision-making by authorities with 
ostensibly liberal commitments? Communitarian philosophy and the 
communitarian ideals of many African cultures offer a partial 
response. Instead of espousing a separation of the right from the good, 
communitarians embrace the use of law to promote the good, the 
specifics of which will vary depending on the values of the society in 
question. In fact, the broader communitarian critique of liberalism 
denies the very possibility of rights (either to autonomy or to equal 
protection) that exist outside of, and precede, the communities in 
which liberals make their claims.231 
At times, Western courts have also embraced community values 
over liberal rights. Justice White’s majority opinion in Bowers, for 
example, explicitly endorsed the idea that moral opprobrium was 
sufficient to validate Georgia’s sodomy law.232 Chief Justice Burger’s 
concurrence also embraced this idea in his statement that protecting 
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right “would be to cast aside 
millennia of moral teaching.”233 Likewise, even today, and even in the 
realm of sexual autonomy, a right the United States Supreme Court 
has held deserving of special protection, illiberal laws prohibiting 
practices like polygamy and prostitution remain intact. Indeed, the 
very notion that liberal rights must give way to compelling state 
interests in the United States’ equal protection and fundamental rights 
jurisprudence arguably represents a concession to 
 
230 The most famous expression of this idea is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, 
discussed in On Liberty. One might argue that, in fact, the rights homosexuals seek to 
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autonomy claim. Communitarian theorists have made just such arguments to illustrate the 
putative illusory nature of liberal arguments. 
231 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
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HUMAN SCIENCES 206 (1985) (claiming “that the free individual of the West is only what 
he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which 
nourishes him.”); Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 444. 
232 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
233 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
2013] Western Universalism and African Homosexualities 363 
communitarianism.234 Certainly, the question in substantive due 
process cases of whether a right is “deeply rooted” in the country’s 
“history and tradition” suggests the relevance of community values in 
determining the significance of a claim. And as Michael Sandel has 
argued, before the turn of the twentieth century, the Bill of Rights 
offered little actual protection for individual rights against the federal 
government. Instead, Americans and their courts tended to conceive 
of liberty as requiring a “dispersion of power among branches and 
levels of government”235 rather than elevation of individual rights 
over community norms. Yet it is clear now that the liberal, 
individualist perspective is deeply rooted, both in American culture 
generally and in American legal culture. 
In contrast, communitarian values have played a far more 
significant role in the actual implementation of law and policy in 
many African nations than in the Western countries whose 
constitutions often provided templates for their African counterparts. 
This practical disparity between liberal constitutional language and 
law in action reflects the communitarian ethics of a broad range of 
traditional African societies, and it illuminates, to some extent, 
African resistance to the full range of liberalism’s implications. I will 
discuss the African context more thoroughly below. First, however, I 
will provide an overview of communitarian philosophy and 
communitarian critiques of liberalism. 
Communitarian philosophers tend to attack liberalism on two 
grounds. First, communitarians contend that liberal claims are 
conceptually incoherent, that exclusion of moral judgments from 
public decision-making is neither practically nor theoretically 
possible.236 Second, communitarians make the normative claim that 
liberal attempts to separate the right and the good are undesirable, for 
 
234 One might argue these limitations are consistent with a liberal framework, given 
consequences for other individuals or the community at large. Again, Mill’s harm 
principle bounds the right to individual autonomy. Of course, without further qualification, 
the harm principle has no stopping point (all actions have third-party impacts) and could 
eviscerate liberalism’s core commitments. Nonetheless, interference with the rights of 
others has always been a sufficient justification for limiting rights in a liberal universe, and 
the idea of compelling state interests inherently involves questions of public import. 
235 SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 38. 
236 See, e.g., Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 444 (citing 
Thomas Moody, Some Comparisons Between Liberalism and Eccentric 
Communitarianism, in THE LIBERALISM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE 91, 96 (C.F. 
Delaney ed., 1994); Michael J. Sandel, Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) (stating that “[t]oleration and freedom and fairness are 
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364 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 315 
they diminish the important function of communities in promoting 
public goods and individual freedom and dignity.237 
Communitarians have rightly observed that liberal philosophy 
offers an inadequate account of the manner in which courts actually 
make decisions. In the context of homosexual rights, for example, 
courts purporting to act as neutral arbiters have, in fact, engaged in 
overt moral analysis. Sandel illustrated this point in his discussion of 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,238 in which the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court found a right to homosexual marriage. 
In her majority opinion, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall claimed 
moral neutrality in noting the irrelevance of the competing moral 
viewpoints that marriage should be between only men and women 
and that members of the same sex should be permitted to marry.239 
Nonetheless, Marshall’s opinion then went on to define the essence of 
marriage as involving an exclusive, permanent commitment between 
partners, 240 whether the individuals in question are heterosexual or 
homosexual. Of course, Marshall’s choice to favor one faction in the 
contest over the social meaning of marriage almost certainly reflects 
her moral perspective, a decision to promote a particular conception 
of the boundaries within which individuals in society should be 
permitted to pursue the good life.241 Yet, as Sandel noted, “[i]f 
government were truly neutral on the moral worth of all voluntary 
intimate relationships, the state would have no grounds for limiting 
marriage to two persons, consensual polygamous partnerships would 
also qualify.”242 
Ultimately, communitarians suggest the very idea of liberal moral 
neutrality is an illusion. Promotion of the core liberal tenets of 
equality and autonomy itself represents a moral judgment that those 
ideals are more important than alternative values, like social welfare, 
community solidarity, or civic responsibility.243 If the liberal concept 
of moral neutrality is practically and conceptually impossible, the 
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liberal promotion of the atomistic individual, making choices in a 
social vacuum, free from social obligation, is also undesirable, 
according to communitarian arguments. Instead, communitarians 
suggest the state should embrace its unavoidable role of promoting 
the good, a concept developed and defined through community 
norms. 
Sandel, perhaps the most prominent communitarian critic of 
liberalism,244 began arguing with his first book that liberalism’s 
glorification of individual rights had diminished the sense of meaning 
in people’s lives and that any complete theory of justice must take 
account of the role of communities and of community obligations in 
shaping individuals.245 According to critics like Sandel, the liberal 
focus on individual autonomy has undervalued the important role 
communities can play in promoting the welfare of the individuals who 
comprise them. The pervasive impact of the liberal perspective on 
every facet of American life and culture has, furthermore, had a 
disheartening impact on individuals as their identities as members of 
communities have been cut off from their identities as democratic 
citizens.246 In the final analysis, according to Sandel, the triumph of 
liberalism has left communities weakened and unresponsive to the 
needs of now isolated, disenchanted citizens.247 
The ultimate “good” Sandel proposes as an alternative to the moral 
void of liberal neutrality is the idea of civic republicanism, the 
promotion of greater engagement with and participation in 
government by citizens. In contrast to liberalism’s ostensible moral 
neutrality and focus on the self-interested individual, making choices 
about how to pursue happiness in the absence of external obligation, 
the civic republican model promotes its particular conception of the 
good—a society in which public spiritedness and regard for public 
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defined with reference to intrinsic moral value, rather than simply to community norms. 
The aims of a perfectionist model are thus independent of widespread support from any 
particular community. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE xi 
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welfare predominate over the bracketed concerns of atomistic 
individuals.248 
In arguing for the potential of communities to enrich and enhance 
the lives of individuals, Sandel emphasizes the crucial role that black 
churches played in advancing the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 
The fruits of that movement included obvious victories for the liberal 
values of individual autonomy and choice, including the end of 
government segregation and the attainment of voting rights for blacks. 
Yet the collective, communal efforts that went into obtaining those 
freedoms represent, for Sandel, a higher-order freedom, which results 
from collective engagement to influence public life.249 
In contrast to Sandel’s identification of a specific moral aim, other 
communitarians have argued for promotion of norms intrinsic only to 
communities of the governed. Michael Walzer’s communitarian 
vision, for example, eschews the idea of any moral framework 
external to community values, but urges distribution of social goods 
in a manner consistent with the meanings a community has chosen to 
ascribe to those goods.250 According to Walzer, for any social good in 
any society, there are accepted principles for determining how to 
distribute the good.251 Each good or set of goods, moreover, has 
distributive standards that differ from those of other social goods.252 
Walzer’s notion of “complex equality” thus requires that society 
allocate each social good according to the community’s shared 
understandings of the good’s significance and without intrusion of 
criteria from other spheres.253 For example, if community tradition 
defines politics as a sphere separate from the market, then money 
should not influence the distribution of political power. Likewise, 
political power should not confer advantages in the marketplace. 
Communitarian responses to liberalism offer some potential for 
advancement of minority rights. As Robin West has urged, liberal 
universalism’s insistence on equality, which entails fundamental 
denial of difference, deprives those seeking to improve the lives of 
minorities of powerful arguments that might aid their cases.254 In the 
case of homosexual marriage, West noted that acceptance of a liberal 
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framework has led homosexual rights advocates to contend that 
homosexual marriage is indistinguishable from heterosexual marriage 
and that the right is, therefore, fundamental regardless of the genders 
of those wishing to exercise it.255 Aside from the empirical 
awkwardness of the denial of difference, West suggested that denial 
also preempts useful claims about the ways that the differences 
between heterosexual and homosexual marriage militate in favor of 
recognition of the latter.256 
In the absence of liberal constraints, for example, one might pursue 
government approval of same-sex marriage by emphasizing that 
homosexual marriage, unlike heterosexual marriage, lacks the 
patriarchal heritage of subjugation of women and represents, instead, 
a partnership of sexual equals.257 Additionally, West proposes that 
proponents of homosexual marriage might embrace the claim of gay 
marriage opponents that homosexual marriage is fundamentally 
different from heterosexual marriage because of its lack of procreative 
potential. Instead of engaging in the liberal denial of difference by 
pointing to heterosexual unions between sterile partners, gay marriage 
advocates might note that the inability of homosexual couples to 
reproduce suggests a more altruistic union, based only on mutual love 
and respect, as opposed to the fundamentally selfish aim of 
propagating one’s genes.258 Finally, West contends the liberal focus 
on legally and morally unencumbered individual decision-makers 
simply belies the fundamentally communal nature of an institution 
like marriage.259 
More broadly, the liberal requirement of moral neutrality prevents 
a wide range of arguments that might be useful in promoting minority 
interests. By requiring tolerance of individual choice, without regard 
to the moral significance of the choices in question, the liberal 
paradigm preempts exposition of the positive good that promoting 
minority interests might entail. In this regard, Sandel criticized the 
dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Bowers. In 
Griswold, the Court had, while advancing the liberal cause, 
nonetheless embraced a moral perspective in its judgment on the 
fundamental value of marriage as “intimate to the degree of being 
sacred . . . an association that promotes a way of life . . . an 
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association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.”260 According to Sandel, Blackmun and Stevens missed an 
opportunity to cast homosexual relationships in similar terms.261 
Instead, Blackmun emphasized the liberal aspects of the Court’s 
earlier opinions,262 and both Blackmun and Stevens stressed the 
importance of individual choice in arguing for the invalidation of 
Georgia’s law.263 Yet, in Sandel’s view, this insistence on liberal 
neutrality results in only a “thin and fragile toleration.”264 It leads 
merely to the idea that one has to put up with homosexuals despite 
disliking them, “just like we have to tolerate all degenerates.”265 
Notwithstanding the potential of the communitarian embrace of 
moral arguments to advance minority interests, I have suggested there 
are good reasons to adhere to a liberal framework. With a true 
communitarian perspective, including disavowal of the very idea of 
rights external to community norms, there is no guarantee that the 
values of the community will promote minority welfare. By 
definition, in fact, communal priorities will reflect majority interests. 
Walzer’s notion of “complex equality,” moreover, is insufficient to 
protect minorities. A follower of Walzer’s philosophy might argue, 
for example, that homosexuals must be permitted to marry because 
the shared community understanding of marriage is that it is a union 
of two individuals choosing to commit their lives to each other based 
on mutual feelings of love, attraction, and respect. Under this 
understanding, the genders of the individuals in question should be 
irrelevant. Yet, as others have pointed out, Walzer’s theory offers an 
insufficient account of the deeply contested meanings of every 
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significant social good.266 Why, for example, should decision makers 
prioritize the notion of marriage that emphasizes romantic choice over 
the vision of the institution as involving the union only of partners of 
the opposite sex?267 
Sandel’s recognition of absolute moral goods also fails to 
sufficiently guarantee minority rights. Although Sandel promoted an 
argument for gay rights based on the similar moral good involved in 
heterosexual and homosexual relationships,268 his approval of moral 
decision-making in constitutional jurisprudence leaves the fate of 
minorities dependent on the moral perspective of the presiding 
judges.269 In the end, Sandel fails to suggest any basis for believing 
judges would be more likely to share his moral perspective than the 
voters and legislators who have, historically, often suppressed 
minority interests.270 
Both West and Ball recognized the potential for communitarian 
ideas to enrich liberal claims. Ultimately, however, as West noted, 
communitarian philosophy is an inadequate alternative to liberalism 
for those concerned with advancing traditional liberal rights, 
including the rights of minorities. Without some commitment to 
rights, there can be no guaranteed basis for challenging dominant 
community norms that conflict with the interests of minorities in 
nondiscrimination or of all people in choosing how to conduct their 
intimate lives. As West put it, “I am certain a commitment to 
liberalism, universalism, and individualism is necessary to provide a 
floor for these arguments; without such a commitment, there is just no 
reason for these arguments to be heard, much less honored or 
heeded.”271 Ball, in the final analysis, reached similar conclusions.272 
Communitarian arguments are particularly salient in the context of 
any discussion of the legal status of homosexuality in Africa because 
of the deep communitarian roots of traditional cultures across the 
continent. Although, as I have already discussed, African countries 
have tended to adopt constitutions that proclaim liberal rights, many 
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of the societies in which those constitutions have arisen have lacked 
the profound cultural commitment to individualism that observers like 
Sandel have noted in the United States. As a consequence, 
communitarian values have frequently explained the actual operation 
of law in African countries better than the putative liberal loyalties 
evinced in African constitutions. 
Countless authors have noted the communitarian leanings of 
traditional cultures across the African continent.273 While African 
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cultures are, and always have been, extremely diverse, communitarian 
tendencies have characterized a wide range of societies throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa. Like communitarianism in the West, descriptions 
of African communitarianism have tended to emphasize 
responsibilities to community rather than individual rights.274 
Many scholars have discussed the communitarian approach to 
property ownership in African cultures.275 As Kelley observed, the 
traditional notion that members of a community might have a range of 
responsibilities for, and claims over, a single parcel of land has 
spurred Western-inspired legal reforms to ensure alienability.276 
Although liberal reforms might pave the way for economic 
development, they also have the potential to alienate many individuals 
who previously had been able to count on complex webs of mutual 
responsibilities to ensure access to community resources.277 Similarly, 
Western-style intellectual property laws conflict with communitarian 
notions of shared cultural knowledge and, some have argued, may 
lead to “debasement and trivialization” of artistic achievements, 
which come to be judged as commodities rather than in terms of their 
social value.278 
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Other authors have discussed the communitarian focus of 
traditional African dispute resolution mechanisms. Writing in 
sweeping terms of the influence of communitarian values in African 
culture, Professor Jacques Frémont asserted that “[t]he first and 
foremost value on the continent is the preservation of social peace 
within the community.”279 T.W. Bennett has noted, likewise, that 
traditional African dispute resolution is less likely to involve the use 
of rules to declare one party the winner and one the loser, and more 
likely to focus on compromise solutions to promote reconciliation.280 
The focus on relationships, as opposed to rules or rights, poses 
obvious challenges for liberal legal arguments. 
Although African constitutions now tend to reflect the Western 
focus on the individual as the most important actor in the political life 
of the society, group imperatives have frequently driven political and 
legal decision-making even in postcolonial Africa. Thus, despite 
adopting constitutions that asserted liberal rights, many African 
leaders in the years following independence relied on the idea of 
group rights to economic development to justify mass subversion of 
individual rights.281 Additionally, even today, in many African 
nations, the liberal frameworks of formal state legal systems are much 
less significant in the day-to-day lives of most people than traditional, 
customary norms.282 To some extent, the continued vitality of 
customary law in the lives of many Africans reflects a lack of 
resources for the development of state justice systems, especially in 
rural areas.283 The continued reliance on traditional norms also 
reflects the formal recognition of customary law as governing various 
spheres, like family relationships, in some countries.284 
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Perhaps the most prominent showcase of the enduring 
communitarian propensities of African cultures is the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Unlike other regional human rights 
documents, the Charter emphasizes group rights, both in its title and 
in its content.285 Additionally, unlike most liberal human rights 
documents, the Charter declares that individuals owe a range of 
duties, including duties to “preserve the harmonious development of 
the family;” “[t]o serve [the] national community by placing both 
physical and intellectual abilities at its service;” “ . . . [t]o preserve 
and strengthen social and national solidarity;” “[t]o preserve and 
strengthen positive African cultural values . . . and, in general, to 
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society;” to 
“contribute to the best of [one’s] abilities . . . to the promotion and 
achievement of African unity;”286 and to exercise all rights with due 
regard for “morality and common interest.”287 
Communitarian proclivities in cultures across Africa suggest the 
likelihood that Africans will continue to be less sympathetic to liberal 
arguments in favor of homosexual rights than even social 
conservatives in the West, where the deep impact of liberalism on the 
broader culture might lead many people to accept reforms protecting 
homosexuals even if they believe homosexual conduct is immoral. 
Additionally, African communitarianism suggests the likelihood of 
pervasive popular backlash if Westerners succeed in pressuring 
judges and political elites to adopt measures protecting homosexuals 
in Africa. As I will discuss in the next section, the coincidence of 
much of the African anthropological record with the anti-essentialist 
claims of queer theorists helps explain why even Africans with 
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apparently strong liberal commitments are less likely than people with 
Western notions of homosexuality to accept liberal arguments for gay 
rights. 
B. Queer Theory 
Like communitarian ideology, the postmodernist philosophy of 
queer theorists offers a counterpoint to liberalism that human rights 
activists might do well to consider. This is particularly the case in 
Africa, where the anti-essentialist claims of queer theorists arguably 
coincide with much of the anthropological record.288 In their denial of 
rights as a meaningful concept, both communitarianism and queer 
theory pose broad challenges to the nondiscrimination and autonomy 
pillars of liberalism. The anti-essentialist component of queer theory, 
moreover, specifically complicates the nondiscrimination arguments 
of homosexual rights advocates. 
Before the latter part of the twentieth century, those who supported 
homosexual rights tended to assume that homosexuality was naturally 
occurring and independent of culture or social circumstance.289 In the 
broader culture, during the period between the late nineteenth century 
and the 1970s, writers on the subject alternated between describing 
homosexuality as a psychological disorder afflicting a subset of the 
population and as a “normal desire present in varying degrees in the 
human population.”290 Heavily influenced by the work of Michel 
Foucault, however, a new group of activists and academics began to 
argue in the 1970s against the notion of a natural foundation for 
sexual identity. Instead, according to these theorists, sexual identity is 
socially contingent, a product of cultural influence rather than an 
inevitable consequence of biology. Although queer theorists have 
acknowledged the historical presence of sexual contact between 
individuals of the same gender, they argue that homosexual identity 
was a late nineteenth-century invention. Before 1870, according to 
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Foucault, “the sodomite had been a temporary aberration,”291 a vice to 
which all were susceptible.292 The idea of homosexuality then 
emerged from scientific and medical discourses that purported to 
assess same-sex sexual contact as characteristic of individuals 
belonging to a stable category.293 With the development of this theory 
of homosexuality, the transgressor had become a member of a 
“species,” the homosexual. 
For liberal homosexual rights advocates, the common notion of 
homosexual identity as a naturally occurring, immutable attribute 
bolsters arguments that homosexuals constitute a class deserving 
protection against discrimination. If homosexual behavior is more 
than simply a fleeting indiscretion, or a product of idiosyncratic taste, 
and is instead a biological imperative for a discrete minority of the 
population, then punishment of members of that minority for acting 
consistently with that imperative, and with no direct third-party 
impacts, becomes more difficult under a liberal paradigm. 
Nonetheless, queer theorists have viewed this essentialist perspective 
as an inadequate safeguard of the freedom of people who engage in 
same-sex intimacies. Rather, these scholars contend, the insistence on 
homosexual identity accepts the majority framework that classifies 
the minority as fundamentally, irretrievably different, and then uses 
that classification as a basis for oppression.294 For Steven Seidman, 
the danger of attempts to normalize homosexuality, as opposed to 
challenging the very concept, results in a “regime which perpetuates 
the production of subjects and social worlds organized and regulated 
by the heterosexual/homosexual binary.”295 In the African context, in 
response to efforts to consolidate evidence of homosexuality in 
African societies across the continent, Neville Hoad wrote of the risk 
of “repeating the commonplaces of commonsense homophobia that 
reduce gay and lesbian relationships to the template of heterosexual 
coupledom.”296 
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For queer theorists, then, the acceptance of essentialist notions, or 
of homosexual identity more broadly, is a double-edged sword. 
Despite the liberal assertion of the potential for such an approach to 
advance minority interests, the acceptance of categories often 
imposed in the service of subjugation exposes the classified minority 
to potential further abuse. This stance represents, for queer theorists, 
part of a larger reaction to the identity politics of the civil rights and 
feminist movements of the 1960s, which, for similar reasons, queer 
theorists have viewed as insufficiently radical.297 Instead of accepting 
models frequently used by majorities as tools of oppression, queer 
theorists advocate deconstruction of those paradigms as a means of 
achieving true liberation.298 
For queer theorists like Michel Foucault and Ladelle McWhorter, 
the means of resistance to dominant power structures has been the use 
of self-transformative practices to escape socially imposed identities 
that reinforce oppressive hierarchies. Foucault discussed the 
transformative potential of the pursuit of “pleasure,” which he defined 
in contrast to the idea of “desire,” a word that had been used by 
medical and religious powers to classify, pathologize, and subjugate 
those considered to have socially unacceptable proclivities and 
passions. The idea of pleasure, on the other hand, was “virgin 
territory,”299 and, as McWhorter would later note, not terribly 
susceptible to quantification and measurement “in terms of 
statistically manipulable developmental norms.”300 For Foucault, 
sadomasochistic sex was an example of such a transformative 
practice, for its potential to create “new possibilities of pleasure, 
which people had no idea about previously” might confound attempts 
to box its practitioners into predefined categories. McWhorter, 
heavily influenced by Foucault, discussed the pursuit of pleasure 
through self-transformative activities like gardening, country dancing, 
and political engagement to advance the rights of homosexuals. For 
McWhorter, as for Foucault, these practices can “increase the range 
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within which we exercise our freedom and within which freedom 
plays itself out beyond who we currently are.”301 
As Ball has observed, this endorsement of political activity to 
promote civil rights results, practically speaking, in an approach that 
resembles liberal advocacy.302 What is clear from the above analysis, 
however, is that the denial of the idea of homosexuality as a purely 
socially constructed category ultimately complicates reliance on the 
kinds of nondiscrimination arguments that could improve the lives of 
people who might, under a liberal framework, be beneficiaries of such 
claims. To the extent that evidence of African sexual practices and 
attitudes coincides with the idea that homosexuality is not a stable 
psychological or social category, African courts are less likely to 
recognize the validity of nondiscrimination arguments. 
The more sweeping challenge queer theory poses for liberal human 
rights activists is similar to the communitarian denial of rights that 
precede social context. Like communitarians, queer theorists deny the 
possibility of rights as anything other than a cultural artifact. As Ball 
has described this outlook, queer theorists do not stop with the denial 
of homosexual identity as preceding social context. Rather, the anti-
essentialism of queer theorists “goes all the way down.”303 For queer 
theorists, not only is group identity socially constructed, but there are 
no essential, foundational components of human identity. Yet, if all 
aspects of human identity are cultural constructions, the very idea of a 
right to equality is undermined. Ultimately, “[i]t is what we all 
(homosexuals, heterosexuals, bisexuals, and transgendered) share as 
human beings that imposes on society moral. . .obligations to abide by 
minimal standards of equality.”304 Similarly, queer theorists have 
critiqued what they view as liberal “delusions of autonomy.”305 
As I will discuss in detail below, the African anthropological 
record has often tended to substantiate the narratives of queer 
theorists. Although that record reveals patterns of same-sex intimacy 
across a wide range of African cultures, it also demonstrates that these 
intimacies often have manifested themselves as evanescent, socially 
contingent phenomena, and the practitioners of these same-sex 
intimacies have frequently assessed their same-sex sexual contacts as 
insignificant parts of their identities. Of course, these data cannot, in 
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the end, answer the scientific question of the extent to which biology 
drives sexual desire. They can, however, illuminate the different 
cultural meanings of physical intimacies. While liberal, Western 
observers would be likely to classify the practitioners of these same-
sex intimacies as members of a stable biological and/or social 
category—homosexuals—that concept has, in fact, been foreign in 
many African cultures. It would, moreover, be foreign even to many 
of those whose lives human rights advocates hope to improve by 
classifying them. 
IV 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL DATA 
Narratives of the modern drive for homosexual identity and 
homosexual rights in Africa often focus on Robert Mugabe’s 
expulsion of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) from the 1995 
Zimbabwean Book Fair as the primary catalyst for the initiation of 
contemporary discourse outside the South African context.306 Since 
the book fair, both Mugabe and other African leaders have 
characterized homosexuality as fundamentally un-African, a Western 
disease, and a neocolonial construction.307 As discussed in Part II, 
these ideas are currently widespread in African society, across 
numerous countries and cultures. While it is tempting to dismiss such 
claims as mere expressions of prejudice and xenophobia, this 
reductive approach fails to account for the complex history of African 
sexual identities, the depth of European influence on African culture 
during the colonial era, and the modern integration and appropriation 
of colonial ideology, rebranded as African tradition, in the service of 
African nationalism. 
In a meaningful but perhaps unintended and unrealized sense, 
characterizations by African leaders of homosexuality as a Western 
import have some factual basis, at least in many cultures. As 
discussed above, even in the West, conceptions of same-sex sexual 
intimacy as a defining emblem of personal and sexual identity 
emerged only in the nineteenth century. Before that, neither those 
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who engaged in transgressive sexual behavior nor society at large 
imagined homosexuality as a discrete psychological, physiological, or 
social category. 
Similarly, throughout sub-Saharan Africa, although 
anthropological evidence demonstrates geographically widespread 
behavior that modern, Western observers would characterize as 
homosexual, historical understandings of this behavior would 
frequently have confounded contemporary constructions of 
homosexual identity. Because most African societies were without 
writing systems until the late nineteenth-century, accounts by 
European explorers and missionaries offer the earliest available first-
hand commentary on cultural practices throughout much of the sub-
continent. These accounts included discussion of nonnormative 
gender roles and transgressive sexual behavior in sub-Saharan African 
cultures as early as the sixteenth century.308 
Nonetheless, early discussions of African sexuality often promoted 
the notion that sexual intimacy between members of the same sex was 
unknown in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1781, in The Decline and Fall of 
the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon wrote, despite general European 
unfamiliarity with most of the African interior, that he “believe[d], 
and hope[d], that the negroes, in their own country, were exempt” 
from the “moral pestilence” of sodomy.309 One hundred years later, 
Richard Burton speculated on what he termed a Sotadic Zone, where 
climate encouraged deviant sexual behavior. According to Burton’s 
hypothesis, only Northern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa were 
exempt from climatologically induced homosexuality.310 
Authors have offered various explanations for such early theories 
of African exceptionalism. Descriptions of same-sex sexual intimacy 
as foreign to African cultures promoted the popular notion of Africa 
as a site of premodern, primitive innocence.311 This vision of African 
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culture dovetailed with fears in the metropole that sexual perversity, 
including homosexuality, was a symptom of modernity.312 
Additionally, these characterizations served the commercial 
imperatives of the slave trade, which depended on depicting the 
hyper-masculinity of the African male to market African bodies as a 
means of production.313 In any case, the absence of African 
homosexuality remained a dominant theme in European thought until 
a new strand of scholarship, starting in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, began to expose the range and complexity of African sexual 
norms.314 Any thorough evaluation of contemporary claims by 
African leaders that homosexuality is a foreign threat must take 
measure of the Western origin of the idea that homosexual practices 
were unknown in African societies. 
These new narratives, however, catalogued same-sex intimacies 
throughout the continent, describing a broad range of practices and 
traditions. Although some of these descriptions validate contemporary 
Western paradigms, they frequently contradict essentialist arguments 
at the heart of much modern rights discourse. In his 1899 description 
of homosexuality in Zanzibar, for example, Michael Haberlandt noted 
two classes of men who engaged in homosexual sex. Some, whom the 
local population considered uninterested in heterosexual relations by 
God’s will (amri ya muungu) showed a lack of interest in women 
from youth.315 This population, which Haberlandt described in 
essentialist terms, was, according to him, congenitally homosexual. 
Such “inborn contraries” were also tolerated, for as soon as their 
relatives noticed their proclivities, “they reconcile[d] themselves 
without further ado to this peculiarity.”316 On the other hand, 
Haberlandt contrasted Zanzibar’s inborn contraries with the “acquired 
contrariness” of the population of sex slaves, who were “kept away 
from any work, well pampered, and systematically effeminized.”317 
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Although this population enjoyed “normal sex acts” in the early 
stages of their socialization and would “remain normal if they 
[weren’t] used for too long as catamites,” over the long term, they 
would lose the capacity for erection and “find . . . pleasure only in 
passive pederasty.”318 
Haberlandt’s descriptions at once affirm the possibility of 
essentialist claims, while also lending credence to social 
constructionist theories, depending on which segment one selects 
from the population he depicts. While Haberlandt delineates alternate 
strains within the same population group (black Zanzibaris) other 
observers of African cultures recorded behavioral patterns 
problematic for anyone invested in an idea of homosexuality as an 
organizing rubric for personal or sexual identity or as an essential, 
immutable physiological imperative. While a comprehensive 
accounting of the massive array of traditions throughout the continent 
is untenable and unnecessary, an overview, including a range of 
cultures, suggests the difficulty of any attempt to impose a 
universalizing organizational structure onto same-sex African 
intimacies. 
Many authors have described the homosexual relationships they 
observed in Africa as situational and evanescent. In Southern Africa, 
anthropological accounts suggest contingent forms of same-sex 
relationships were the predominant structure for homosexuality in 
some cultures. In reporting on her fieldwork from the 1930s amongst 
the Nyakyusa, a Bantu group northwest of Lake Malawi, Monica 
Wilson observed that same-sex intimacy between adolescent boys 
was both common and tolerated.319 Even so, these relationships 
apparently seldom outlasted bachelorhood, and Wilson’s informants 
contended that married Nyakyusa men invariably preferred 
females.320 The few men who never married were “half-wits who 
ha[d]no kind of intercourse at all.”321 
Numerous authors have documented the common practice of 
migrant miners in South Africa forming short-term same-sex 
marriages. Perhaps most famously, T. Dunbar Moodie and Vivienne 
Ndatshe catalogued the contours of these relationships in Going for 
Gold: Men, Mines and Migration. In Moodie and Ndatshe’s account, 
mine marriages reflected patterns of resistance to proletarianization 
 
318 Id. at 64. 
319 MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 174–75. 
320 Id. at 175–76. 
321 Id. at 176. 
382 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 315 
by the men involved,322 many of whom had left wives behind in their 
rural homelands. These men often resorted to mine marriages because 
they considered women in the towns near the mines as threats to their 
ambitions of returning eventually to establish households in their 
ancestral communities.323 In his analysis of migrant labor in colonial 
Zimbabwe, Charles van Onselen noted similar practices but drew 
different conclusions about the political significance of the behaviors. 
According to van Onselen, mining companies tolerated, if not 
encouraged, prostitution, bestiality, and homosexuality amongst 
African men,324 which helped “to secure a relatively docile labour 
force with minimal expenditure on wages, social services, and urban 
infrastructure—distracted and presumably demoralized by sexually 
sordid affairs, the men were disabled from organizing effective 
resistance against the appalling working and living conditions.”325 For 
van Onselen, then, the proliferation of same-sex intimacy amongst 
migrant mine workers represented a tool of racial capitalism, rather 
than a method of resistance against it. 
In 1900, Paolo Ambrogetti described the common practice of 
young Eritrean boys having sexual relationships with older men.326 
According to Ambrogetti, such relationships were considered only 
minor transgressions, and the boys’ fathers often welcomed the 
arrangements their sons made as a source of family income.327 
Nonetheless, after the boys went through puberty, they usually ended 
these affairs and began courting women.328 E.E. Evans-Pritchard 
reported on the practices of the Azande, who live in parts of what are 
now Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Congo. In describing 
Azande lesbian practices, Evans-Pritchard noted that such 
relationships were common in polygamous households in which a 
woman might go for months without sharing her husband’s bed and in 
which the seclusion of wives prevented heterosexual adultery.329 The 
predominant form of male same-sex intimacy occurred between 
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warriors and their boy-wives—between the ages of twelve and 
twenty—and Evans-Pritchard attributed the acceptance of such 
marriages to the difficulty for Azande warriors of obtaining 
satisfaction in heterosexual marriages; presumably, heterosexual 
arrangements would have been particularly problematic when war 
broke out, but warriors were able to take their boy-wives with them. 
With the dissolution of the military companies and royal court in 
post-European times, as marriage between men and women became 
easier, Pritchard noted, boy-marriage disappeared.330 
In West Africa, the Mossi, in contemporary Burkina Faso, like the 
Eritreans and the Azande, engaged in age-defined same-sex 
relationships. Mossi chiefs would choose pages from the most 
attractive boys between ages seven and fifteen.331 These pages dressed 
as women and engaged in sexual practices with the chiefs, 
particularly on Fridays, when Mossi tradition forbade sex with 
women.332 Once pages matured, however, they took female wives.333 
Today, even in African cultures in which people tend to engage in 
same-sex intimacies throughout their lives, participants are often 
unlikely to identify themselves as homosexuals or to prioritize same-
sex intimacy over heterosexual marriage. Amongst the Hausa in 
Kano, Nigeria, for example, although men who engage in same-sex 
intimacies consider their desires to be inborn and immutable, these 
men also consider same-sex intimacy primarily as a form of play, and 
as secondary in importance to reproductive obligations in 
heterosexual marriage.334 Similarly, in Nii Ajen’s survey of West 
African homosexuality, the author emphasized that West African men 
who have sex with men also tend to have heterosexual relationships 
and marriages, and such men commonly reject any suggestion of gay 
identity, which simply does not have cultural resonance for them.335 
Other accounts have also noted that, throughout West Africa, only a 
small percentage of men who engage in same-sex intimacy identify 
themselves as being gay, and “[s]ex between men is not automatically 
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labeled as homosexual behavior.”336 In South Africa as well, many 
men who engage in same-sex sexual practices reject homosexual 
identity as un-African and as a Western construct.337 
In some cases, imposition of Western sexual paradigms onto 
African societies has entailed mischaracterization of cultural practices 
that likely involve no sexual intimacy at all. For example, Nigerian 
sociologist Ifi Amadiume has noted that Western attempts to label as 
lesbian the woman-to-woman marriages that take place in some West 
African societies would be “shocking and offensive to Nnobi women, 
since the strong bonds and support between them do not imply lesbian 
sexual practices.”338 Amadiume has argued that such characterizations 
impose Western prejudices onto African material as a means of 
justifying “choices of sexual alternatives which have roots and 
meaning in the West.339 
Some accounts offer potential validation for essentialist claims, and 
such validation is even possible from close reading of some of the 
same commentaries that seem to undermine the essentialist paradigm. 
In Ambrogetti’s description of the fleeting relationships of pre-
pubescent Eritreans with older men, for example, one notes that 
although the boys apparently grew out of these relationships after 
adolescence and began to pursue women, the very fact that there were 
older men who offered a demand for such affairs suggests a less 
contingent form of desire for same-sex intimacy in a segment of the 
population; presumably these men also had wives and families. 
Although Evans-Pritchard described Azande homosexuality as 
common when women were unavailable, he also noted that some 
princes slept with boys “just because they like them,”340 and that some 
men married boys even when they also had female wives.341 
There are several reasons to read these colonial accounts with 
suspicion, whatever the conclusions of their authors. First, the 
realities these writers perceived necessarily reflected the tropes that 
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shaped their expectations. Second, colonial writers could, by 
definition, observe African cultures only after exposure of those 
cultures to the potential influence of contact with the outside world; 
this fact necessarily complicates any attempt to identify “authentic” 
tradition. 
Ultimately, no anthropological account can answer the question of 
whether, as liberal essentialists typically argue, homosexuality is a 
product of an immutable biological imperative, or, alternatively, a 
consequence only of social construction. What these reports can 
convey, however, is the significance individuals in various cultures 
ascribe to their desires. If in many cultures, practitioners of same-sex 
intimacies define those practices in terms that are incongruous with 
Western conceptions of homosexuality, whose agenda is served, one 
might ask, by insisting on classifying the foreign custom in Western 
terms? 
In the end, whether the underlying basis for the conduct Westerners 
refer to as homosexual is biological or cultural, the anthropological 
evidence suggesting primarily contingent forms of same-sex intimacy 
in some African cultures, and the disinclination of even those who 
engage in lifelong homosexual intimacies in others to organize their 
identities around those relationships or desires, are significant 
obstacles to liberal homosexual rights advocates. At the very least, a 
survey of the historical reports of same-sex intimacies in African 
cultures complicates the assertions of anyone invested in pursuing a 
homosexual rights agenda based on Western conceptions of 
homosexuality as an essential, immutable characteristic, as primarily 
involving relationships between legal peers, and as a principal marker 
of psychic, social, or political identity. 
Of course, as any careful reader will have noticed, this is not the 
end of the story. The very presence of groups like GALZ in 
Zimbabwe suggests that whatever the culture in Zimbabwe once was, 
there clearly are now Zimbabweans who precisely fit the mold of the 
Western homosexual. Likewise, homosexual advocacy and the 
limited presence of community groups in other countries demonstrate 
that today, there are African homosexuals across the continent.342 
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V 
THE WAY FORWARD 
Given the forgoing analysis, what is a well-intentioned Western 
liberal concerned about protecting people who engage in same-sex 
intimacies in Africa to do? There are no easy answers to that question. 
Without doubt, African laws and attitudes toward homosexuality have 
had devastating consequences for some practitioners of same-sex 
intimacies on the continent. On the other hand, liberal human rights 
advocates would do well to recall Kelley’s admonition about the 
potential for liberal reforms in the developing world to go wrong. It is 
easy to imagine the possibility that Western pressure for homosexual 
rights in Africa might have negative, unintended repercussions. An 
understanding of communitarian philosophy, queer theory, and 
evidence of cultural beliefs and practices from across Africa 
facilitates comprehension of that potential. Given the focus on group 
values over individual rights in many African cultures, Western 
pressure may incite deeper political backlash than one might expect in 
a society with a more ingrained cultural commitment to the atomistic 
individual at the center of liberal ideology. This backlash could 
further endanger Africans who engage in same-sex sexual practices. 
Compounding the problem, the liberal insistence on classifying 
Africans who practice same-sex intimacies as homosexuals, even 
though many of the intended beneficiaries of that classification have 
not thought of themselves in such terms, could make Africans who 
have same-sex sexual experiences easier targets for violence and 
persecution. 
Some observers have already noted backlash against Western 
pressure for homosexual rights in Africa. In the wake of Obama’s 
declaration that federal agencies should promote homosexual rights in 
foreign countries, and David Cameron’s threat to cut British aid to 
nations that criminalize homosexual conduct, some African countries 
that had largely ignored homosexuality reacted by focusing 
significant negative attention on the issue for the first time. In Liberia, 
for example, although sodomy had been a misdemeanor punishable 
by up to a year in prison, there had been no prosecutions under the 
law in the years leading up to the American announcement.343 That 
proclamation, however, incited a wave of Liberian denunciations of 
homosexuality, and in its wake, Liberian legislators introduced bills 
to make same-sex sexual practices and homosexual marriage 
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felonies.344 Likewise, the International Gay Bisexual Trans and 
Intersex Association noted in 2013 that “diplomatic ties of aid to ‘gay 
rights’ by western allies to African countries have perpetuated greater 
homophobia in Africa with ‘gays’ being viewed as the stumbling 
block to access public welfare funding for health, education, shelter 
and other basic public amenities tied to western funding.”345 
The damaging potential of political backlash to anti-majoritarian 
legal reform has been noted in the West as well. In the United States, 
Professor Michael Klarman has argued that, in the short term, Brown 
v. Board of Education generated harmful backlash that reversed the 
progress of social reform movements that had increased black 
suffrage and integration in universities and sports competitions in the 
South in the years leading up to the decision.346 Likewise, Roe v. 
Wade may have fostered the development of America’s right-to-life 
movement, altering the contours of American political discourse and 
making abortion reform more difficult. Supreme Court Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has endorsed this view, arguing that Roe’s short-
circuiting of the political process led to enduring conservative 
resistance to abortion.347 In the context of gay rights, Klarman noted 
that cases like Lawrence, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that 
homosexuals have a right to marry, inspired states that had not 
previously considered the issue to amend their constitutions to ban 
gay marriage and mobilized conservative resistance to homosexual 
rights.348 
By 2013, Klarman had concluded that massive resistance to a 
broad ruling that homosexuals have a right to marry would be 
unlikely.349 He noted that public opinion had shifted on the matter and 
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that, unlike segregation, a marriage equality ruling would not have 
any significant, direct impact on the lives of opponents.350 Moreover, 
unlike the potential to subvert integration through the continued 
power of local officials to assign students to schools after Brown, or 
to subvert abortion rights by imposing oppressive regulations on 
clinics, there would be little opportunity to undermine a broad 
marriage equality ruling.351 Public opinion in Africa, however, has not 
shifted dramatically in favor of homosexual rights.352 Additionally, 
backlash to counter-majoritarian gay rights reform could be both 
more virulent and more sustained in cultures that lack the West’s 
entrenched cultural commitment to individual rights. In the United 
States, for example, the almost reflexive dedication to individual 
choice may lead many of those who strongly disapprove of 
homosexual conduct to conclude that such conduct must be tolerated 
nonetheless. Members of societies in which liberal legal commitments 
reflect the choices of political elites, rather than mirroring widespread 
cultural attitudes, might come to different conclusions. 
Backlash to Western pressure might take many forms. It could 
mean disorganized, random acts of violence against people perceived 
to be homosexuals. It could mean legislative measures that increase 
penalties for homosexual behavior, as in Liberia, or that criminalize 
homosexual conduct for the first time. If human rights groups 
successfully petition courts for decisions protecting homosexual 
rights, or if opponents fear they might, it could mean constitutional 
amendments that entrench discrimination against practitioners of 
same-sex intimacies. In Zambia, this possibility seems likely to come 
to fruition, as the convention drafting the Fourth Republican 
Constitution has recommended provisions on “anti-social behavior” 
to preclude the possibility that homosexuals might use fundamental 
rights provisions to support court claims.353 
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Klarman identified three likely reasons for backlash to counter-
majoritarian court decisions in the United States: such decisions 
increase the salience of the issue; anger over outside interference; and 
alteration of the order in which social change would have occurred in 
the absence of interference.354 Each of these considerations is 
certainly significant to any calculation of the likely depth of resistance 
to efforts by Western human rights advocates to advance homosexual 
rights in Africa. In Africa, however, Western stimulus has increased 
the salience of homosexuality in a way that goes beyond merely 
focusing a spotlight on an issue that many had previously ignored. It 
has also had a creative impact on the African imagination, generating 
a social category that in many societies had never existed. 
When leaders like Mugabe suggest that Western influence is 
responsible for the spread of homosexuality in Africa, they are likely 
correct, although in an unintended in sense; people in Africa have 
always engaged in same-sex intimacies, but the presence in 
contemporary African cultures of some people who define those 
intimacies in terms congruous with modern conceptions of 
homosexuality may indeed be the consequence of Western 
influence.355 On the other hand, no culture is static. Today, there are 
some Africans who conceive of themselves as homosexuals in a sense 
that would be familiar in the West, and these people also have a claim 
to a place in the various African cultures of which they are a part. 
Still, other Africans who have same-sex sexual contacts continue to 
resist homosexual identity. Westerners who insist on classifying all 
Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies as homosexuals—
despite the inconsistency of that classification with the visions many 
of its intended beneficiaries have of their own lives—may expose the 
people they hope to assist to greater hostility and oppression than they 
had faced before. 
Even for Africans who identify themselves as homosexuals, 
coercive pressure from the West might not be the best solution. As 
other authors have observed, the liberal myth that American 
homosexuals were unable to lead satisfying lives before the Stonewall 
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riots of 1969 sparked the gay rights movement belies reality.356 
Instead, long before Stonewall, American homosexuals successfully 
formed communities that provided some measure of camaraderie, 
freedom, and insulation against the hostility of the outside world.357 
Similarly, even in the absence of laws protecting homosexual rights in 
Africa, African homosexuals have formed communities that offer 
friendship, emotional support, and solace. It is entirely conceivable 
that pressure from Western rights advocates might incite reactions 
that could harm those communities and stymie possibilities for slow 
progress toward greater acceptance.358 
Cultural dynamism also cuts both ways. Pointing out the presence 
of some modern African homosexuals is a reasonable response to 
anthropological narratives that suggest primarily contingent forms of 
same-sex intimacy in Africa. If that is the case, however, it makes 
little sense to emphasize that outsiders originally introduced Africa’s 
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anti-sodomy laws and the Muslim and Christian ideology that 
continue to inspire African intolerance for homosexuality. Those 
laws, and that ideology, helped transform African cultures into what 
they are today and are now as much a part of those cultures as older, 
pre-colonial traditions that have been frequently transformed and 
sometimes forgotten. Western attempts to disparage African attitudes 
by denying agency to those who express them echo colonial 
discourses and fit perfectly the historical pattern of distinguishing 
colonized populations as failing to meet minimum criteria for access 
to the full range of liberal rights. This condescending approach to 
human rights advocacy is likely to generate further resistance. 
In the final analysis, the best way for Westerners to improve the 
lives of practitioners of same-sex intimacies in Africa might be to step 
back from the front lines. Complete disengagement from a human 
rights crisis may be impossible for those with liberal philosophical 
commitments, and total abandonment of the issue is not desirable. 
Ultimately, the liberal insistence on the existence of universal rights 
provides better protection to marginalized minorities than the 
liberating potential of postmodernist deconstruction of identity or 
emphasis on the benefits of community; denial of the existence of 
rights as anything more than a reflection of the power relations and 
values of the particular communities in which such claims arise 
severely diminishes arguments for taking minority interests seriously. 
Yet even without direct attempts by Westerners to shape African law, 
the inexorable influence of Western culture and the independently 
evolving attitudes of members of African cultures may lead 
eventually toward greater acceptance of homosexuality in Africa. A 
more modest approach may also benefit the large numbers of Africans 
who have intimate contacts with people of the same sex but who do 
not consider themselves homosexuals, many of whom have likely 
faced negative consequences from the rising salience of 
homosexuality in Africa and the association of homosexual rights 
advocacy with cultural imperialism. In any case, direct engagement 
by Westerners in a battle for homosexual rights in Africa might well 
do more harm than good. There will always be struggles within every 
society to define the past in order to shape the present and influence 
the future. When strangers with little understanding of the context for 
those struggles attempt to affect their outcomes, they tend to face 
unintended and, at times, deeply undesirable consequences. There is 
no simple solution, but if liberals hope to have a positive impact on 
the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa, we 
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should structure our interactions with the cultures we hope to 
influence as conversations rather than as lectures or commands. 
 
 
